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Abstract 
 
Over the last forty to fifty years the industry that supports international development 
cooperation, has become more complex in its pursuit of multifaceted development 
objectives. Studies suggest that history, politics and a power differential between aid 
recipients and the foreign aid workforce undermine the development policy process 
locally. This study explores local engagement on development policy in Malawi, 
between public officials/aid recipients and donor-agency practitioners/foreign aid 
workforce; and the role of the 2008 Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness in 
this engagement. The two significant findings are that, while there are some adverse 
effects of history, politics and power in engagement on development policy, there is 
also evidence of replicable outcomes that can bolster the policy process. Secondly, 
the democracy model in practice in Malawi is struggling to deliver development 
policy dividends. The study concludes that both the state and donor agencies 
working in Malawi should mutually leverage global commitments, domestically, and 
use them to negotiate an increase in development aid committed to improving the 
development processes, for greater national ownership. The study specifically 
recommends the adoption of deliberative democratic development processes. This 
nuanced approach may improve Malawi’s ability to yield development policy 
dividends. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Several commentators have argued that changes in the dynamics between post-
colonial states and colonial masters have been influenced by the reconfiguration of 
the global world order and the acceleration of digitally aided globalisation. These 
changes have purportedly served to perpetuate the subordination of post-colonial 
states by their colonial masters. It is also argued that this has affected the post-
colonial states prospects for development, through domestic policy. This among 
other concerns, has added to the calls for a new form of global governance to 
manage the affairs of what has come to be viewed as our ‘shrinking world’ (Falk, 
2006; Held & McGrew, 2003). 
This study will examine the engagement that occurs on development policy, between 
Public Officials and Practitioners within Malawian based donor agencies. This 
national level engagement takes place within a milieu of ideological, theoretical and 
practice based debates (both explicitly and implicitly), on a diverse range of internal 
and external issues, which have a bearing on the formulation of Development Policy 
for Malawi. The study will examine relevant historical and political issues that 
influence the Malawian development policy space, to understand their implications 
for engagement. In this study the term engagement refers to the processes of 
communication, interaction, and negotiation geared towards social transformation 
(Finlayson, 2005). 
1.1. Background	to	the	Study	
 
The ‘Washington Consensus’ policy prescriptions (1980’s and 1990’s), which 
advocated for ‘poverty reduction through good governance’, was characterised by 
significant donor influence in the development policies of developing countries. This 
‘Washington consensus’ perpetuated the notion of a North-South relationship, in 
which the North is viewed as enabling the South to fulfil its objectives of poverty 
reduction, amongst other objectives, by this means justifying northern prescription of 
policy (Johnson & Wilson, 2006; Hatton & Schroeder, 2011). The Consensus’s policy 
implementation was made up of a combination of ‘knowledge’ transfer and 
development financing, which was interwoven with conditionality’ (Ruckert, 2006).  
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For sub-Saharan Africa more specifically, parallels can be drawn between the North 
– South relationship that drove the Washington Consensus, and the Eurafrican 
partnerships between Europe and Africa. Eurafrica is a term that has been used to 
encapsulate the relationship between European colonial powers and their African 
colonies. It has been in use from the early 1900’s, and appears to have gained 
currency in the literature on the early post-colonial era (1960’s), with less reference 
in the last decade. This relationship was largely based on the concepts of 
complementarity and interdependence, while granting the colonies fluctuating 
amounts of preferential treatment (Martin, 1982; NORRAG, 1998).  
From 1964, the fundamentals of the Eurafrican relationship experienced a series of 
modifications, through the evolution of various international conventions between the 
European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, namely; 
Yaoundé I and II, followed by Lomé I, II, III and IV, and more recently the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement (CPA) (Mackie, 2008; Martin, 1982). The context of the 
Eurafrican relations, within the broader North – South context, is used to advance 
the argument that there is a power differential in the North – South relationship.  
It is this asymmetry that undermines the prospects for establishing a relationship or 
rather partnership which genuinely espouses the principles of mutuality and equality 
(Hatton & Schroeder, 2011; Hurt, 2012). Nevertheless, a new global politics of 
development appears during the late 1990’s, bringing with it a new rhetoric, 
advocating for national ownership of development policy and partnerships for 
development (Hickey, 2012; Ruckert, 2006). It would appear however, that this shift 
has occurred without significantly acting to address the power differential, which 
seems to be inherent in North – South Relations, or to deal with the implications for 
national level engagement on development policy (ODI, DIE&ECDPM, 2013).  
Malawi is a significant recipient of foreign aid, to the extent that foreign aid accounts 
for approximately 40 percent of the national budget (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009; 
Wroe, 2012). At the aggregate level, foreign aid to Malawi has been in support of 
democratic development and socioeconomic development (Resnick, 2012).The 
limited studies that exist, exploring the relationship between foreign aid for 
democracy and socioeconomic development, uncover a multilayered conflict 
between the funding to the two objectives. This conflict bears a consequence on the 
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amount of power that donors are able to wield in the pursuit of, otherwise nobly 
stated, development objectives at the country level (Resnick, 2012a). In so doing, 
the country level relationship between aid, democratisation and power, has the 
potential to perpetuate the power differential identified at the global levels, in the 
paragraphs above. 
As an ex-British Colony, and signatory to all the EU-ACP conventions, from Lomé I 
onwards, Malawi is situated within the Eurafrican and North-South context described 
above. This research seeks to understand how this global and regional context of 
power asymmetry manifests within the microcosm of Malawian country level 
engagement, between the public officials and locally based donor agency 
practitioners, specifically with regards to development policy. 
1.2. The	Problem	Statement	
Global and national development problems, solutions and opportunities, have 
become interconnected in the world today. This has motivated the need to 
collaborate and cooperate in the pursuit of means and ways of addressing the 
complex development challenges. The most prolific approach to 
collaboration/cooperation has been through various forms of partnerships for 
development. One of the supporting arguments is that partnerships increase the 
likelihood of success in development interventions (Edwards, 2004; Morse and 
McNamara, 2006).  
In the global arena, initiatives like the South-South Cooperation, North–South 
Cooperation, and more recently the Triangular Cooperation, have established 
various partnership principles, to facilitate these multifaceted partnership processes 
(Johnson and Wilson, 2006; Rampa and Bilal, 2011; Tortora, 2011). However, these 
partnerships also consist of many complexities, amongst which are issues of 
inequality, power imbalances, and trust. Malawi is a country that remains largely 
dependent on development aid, and development cooperation, for it to increase its 
chances of conceiving as well as implementing successful development 
interventions. This context of dependence has the potential of fostering unequal 
partnerships. Partnerships which, as a result, are skewed in favour of cooperating 
partner interest; and these interests may not always be aligned with national 
interests.  
Page 4 of 100 
 
For Malawi to yield optimal benefits from development partnerships there is a need 
to understand the subtleties that exist, in both the emergence and evolution of these 
relationships. The pace of transformation in the development cooperation space 
necessitates the production of up-to-date and relevant knowledge, on the nature of 
the interactions between development partners. This knowledge should be fed back 
into partner decision-making processes, towards the realisation of development 
effectiveness.  
1.3. The	Purpose	Statement	
The purpose of this study is to understand the emergence and effects, of 
engagement between public officials and locally based practitioners, on development 
policy in Malawi. An exploration of the nature of these engagements will assist in 
identifying the key issues that potentially distract from the conceptualisation and 
implementation of successful development policy in Malawi. 
1.4. The	Research	Questions	
1. In what ways does engagement emerge, between public officials and locally 
based donor-agency practitioners, on political and technical issues relating to 
development policy? 
1. What role do the evolving global partnership commitments play, in the 
engagement between public officials and locally based donor-agency 
practitioners, on development policy in Malawi? 
2. What are the effects of engagement on development policy in Malawi, 
between public officials and locally based donor-agency practitioners? 
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2. THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review has been conducted as a narrative review, and involved a wide 
search and critical reading of literature pertaining to the research questions (Bryman, 
2012).  
The main research question delves into the history of the sovereign state, as it 
relates to the world order, to understand the conceptual basis on which the Malawian 
state was formed. It also explores the effects that globalisation, has and may have, 
in situating a post-colonial state, like Malawi, in an ever evolving world order. The 
review engages with the progressive debates surrounding global consensus on the 
critical principles that should underlie aid effectiveness as they relate to both donor 
countries and foreign aid recipient countries, like Malawi. 
After setting the historical context within which engagement emerges on 
development policy, between public officials and locally based donor-agency 
practitioners, the review examines some democracy theories. Looking at some of the 
strengths, limitations and the implications for at least two schools of thought on 
democracy theory. Demonstrating, through the literature, how at least one of these 
schools of thought, is able to enhance the ways in which engagement emerges in 
development policy, within a democratic setting.  
Specific reference is made to the debates surrounding German Philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas’s theory of Deliberative Democracy. Included is a series of reinforcing 
arguments, demonstrating how it is that deliberative democracy supports and 
promotes the legitimacy of overall democratic decision-making, which is inclusive of 
decisions on development policy. Furthermore, demonstration is made of how 
deliberative democracy facilitates the design of institutions that are responsive to the 
fundamental tenets of a democracy. In this study  
“…an institution is, in part, a set of regularised patterns of human behaviour 
that persist over time and perform some significant social function or activity… 
These regularised patterns of behaviour, which we often call rules or 
structures, can affect decision-making and the content of public policy. Rules, 
structural arrangements, and other institutional features are usually not 
neutral in their effects; rather, they tend to favour some interests in society 
over others and some policy results over others.”(Anderson, 2011, p. 25) 
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Due to the study’s overarching preoccupation with engagement on development 
policy, between national and international development actors, and since 
development policy plays a significant role in the aid effectiveness agenda, the 
literature review for the main and two sub-questions concentrates on the globally 
recognised aid effectiveness principles of Ownership, Partnership and Alignment, 
each in varying degrees of detail. These principles represent three out of the five 
principles contained in the 2008 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005 
& 2008). In addition to the above mentioned, the review also explores some of the 
conflicts that exist between the conceptualisation and implementation of these select 
aid effectiveness principles at the in-country, operational, level. 
2.1. Literature	pertaining	to	the	Main	Research	Question	
The main question seeks to understand the ways in which engagement emerges 
between public officials and locally based practitioners within donor agencies, on 
political and technical issues relating to development policy. 
2.1.1. Globalisation,	the	Nation‐State	and	Aid	
The origins of the modern day state can be traced back to the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia, and its associated notion of sovereignty. This ushered in the notions of 
the sovereign state (beginning with the sovereign European states before 
sovereignty was extended to non-European countries in later years), the nation-
state, and absolute power over the territory of the sovereign state; just to mention a 
few of its fundamental features. (Anghie, 2006; Falk, 2006; Lupel, 2005; Walby, 
2003).This facilitated the formation of a  
“… 'society of states' (that) laid down the formal rules which all sovereign and 
autonomous states would, in principle, have to adopt if they were to become 
full and equal members of the international order of states.”(Held, et. al., 
2003, p. 9). 
The usefulness of the Westphalian ideals have attracted a great deal of interest and 
debate in recent years, as they relate to the realities of post-colonial states like 
Malawi; this amidst the contemporary concerns of globalisation and agitation for a 
new world order. In particular, Anghie (2006) has argued that the post-colonial 
applicability of this Westphalian-inspired-sovereignty, simply serves to further an 
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imperialist mission of dominance and control. He also argues that colonial relations, 
in the form of neo-colonialism, continue irrespective of the formal end of colonisation. 
In addition to this to this, Anghie (2006) suggests that international law has facilitated 
the subordination of the post-colonial third world countries, rendering their 
sovereignty meaningless. This, he argues, has been accomplished by the use of 
international law, to ensure that the political sovereignty of the non-European states, 
and as such post-colonial states, lacks corresponding economic independence.  
It must be recognised that the degree of economic independence and prosperity, 
varies across the post-colonial states, with most African states featuring at the 
stagnate end of the spectrum. This is evidenced by the longitudinal performance of 
the majority of African states in various composite indices including the Human 
Development Index. Stephan Haggard (1986) utilises Peter Evans’s triple alliance 
model, which falls within the rubric of dependency theory, to argue that “the balance 
of power within the "triple alliance" of state, local, and foreign firms” (Haggard, 1986, 
p. 346) can assist in understanding the differences in the economic prosperity of 
post-colonial states. Lawson (2003) argues that the differences in outcomes, as a 
result of balancing the alliances within the triple alliance, are steeped in the histories 
of the social structures within the state, as well as the formation of these states. 
Lawson (2003) posits that the arbitrary distribution of African territories formalised 
during the 1884 Berlin Conference, together with its successive “…administration on 
the cheap (devoid of)… intensive policies of social and economic transformation” 
(Lawson, 2003, p. 41), have contributed to the perpetuity of the weak African States. 
She (Lawson, 2003) argues that post Berlin Conference territories featured weak 
administration, which was compensated by a heavy juridical culture and reinforced 
by co-opted traditional authorities. Since the European colonial masters tended to 
deploy minimalist administrative infrastructure, the pre-colonial territories developed 
a dual authoritarian social and political structure. This pre-colonial structure featured 
traditional authorities who had been subdued to the European Colonialist dictates on 
one hand, while on the other hand the same traditional authorities were also 
clamouring to protect their own local authority. Leticia (Lawson, 2003) concludes that 
it is these circumstances amongst others, that have contributed to the emergence, 
and subsequent persistence of weak African states, which have emerged as 
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“…severely lacking in infrastructural power, and socially rootless” (Lawson, 2003, p. 
42). 
The OAU Charter’s Article III (1963), affirms the principle of the sovereign equality of 
the OAU member states, in accordance with the political boundaries which were 
inherited from the Berlin Conference delineations. Amadife and Warhola (1993) 
argue that it is this unchallenged continuation of these geographically based 
delineations, as opposed to ethno-nationally based delineations, which have only 
served to buttress the inherently weak colonial state structures, contrary to the 
OAU’s original intent. As such one can draw a logical conclusion from this line of 
argument: that the OAU did not provide an adequate challenge to the structural 
deficiencies inherent in the post-colonial states, rendering its sovereignty principle 
toothless. 
An additional layer of complexity is introduced with the superimposition of 
globalisation on contexts that are already grappling with the notion of sovereignty, 
particularly in the less ‘powerful’ states (Held, et. al., 2003) . While commentators on 
the subject of globalisation, like David Held (as cited in Falk, 2006), do not view the 
effects of globalisation as overtaking the role of the state, rather modifying the role of 
the state, by “…changing the ways peoples and institutions behave at various levels 
of social interaction” (David Held as cited in Falk, 2006, p. 732). Nevertheless, it is 
suffice to say that the transnational effects of globalisation on social organisation has 
had a constraining effect on the national politics of post-colonial states, due to their 
relative positioning in the broader world order (Held, et. al., 2003). As such, Held (as 
cited in Lupel, 2005) does recognise the threat that globalisation poses to traditional 
forms of democratic processes in these de-colonialised states. 
Much of the existing research suggests that the applicability of the notion of a nation-
state has many limitations for the latter day post-colonial states (Barro, 2012; Deasi, 
2008; Lupel, 2005; Mitzen, 2005). While Held, et. al. (2003) argue that the force that 
links nations to states is nationalism; on the other hand it has been argued that the 
history of nationalism in post-colonial states is laden with ideological dissonance 
(Desai, 2008). Desai’s (2008) conclusions, drawn from a study of the historical 
progression of nationalism in post-colonial states, suggest that the evolving notions 
of nationalism have failed to yield and consolidate egalitarian gains for their 
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societies. Like Held, Desai (2008) also views the argument, that the ‘age of 
globalisation’ has precipitated the decline in nations, as facile. However, the social 
reconfiguration effects of globalisation, do suggest an increase in the breadth and 
range of polities with which the nation-state is required to engage, which attracts a 
distinct set of challenges for post-colonial states (Walby, 2003). 
The definition of polity, which is used in this paper, is an entity with varied “…forms 
of authority, power and means to enforce sanctions” (Walby, 2003, p. 534). As such, 
it can be argued that the state in Malawi and the development community represent 
two distinct polities within the Malawi territory. This is not dismissive of the reality that 
the development community, more broadly and in Malawi, does not represent one 
homogenous block. Rather, that it is constituted of several different polities for 
example; regional polities or hegemonies i.e. the EU, multilaterals and other forms 
global governance, as well as providers and conduits of development aid for 
development activities.  
While it has been recognised above that the polities vary in terms of authority, power 
and the capability to enforce sanction, then it stands to reason that some polities will 
be stronger or weaker than others, with consequences for global, regional and 
national policy formulation. This reasoning is supportive of Held et. al.’s (2003) 
argument that,  
“The state has become a fragmented policy-making arena, permeated by 
transnational networks (governmental and non-governmental) as well as by 
domestic agencies and forces. Likewise, the extensive penetration of civil 
society by transnational forces has altered its form and dynamics.”  (Held, et. 
al., 2003, p. 11) 
The rapid increase in interconnectedness which is characteristic of the globalisation 
age, suggests a decline in strategic policy choices that are available to governments. 
It also raises concerns about the potential ineffectiveness of domestic policy 
processes and instruments, when viewed in light of the competing interest of the 
various polities in the global, regional and national social orders (Held, et. al., 2003). 
These potentially divisive effects of globalisation on the state provide a logical segue 
into the centrality of the regulation of conflict in the achievement of public order.  
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The public sphere, which is likened to the concept of civil society, is defined as 
identified socio-cultural institutions originating in the eighteenth century, “…these 
institutions constituted a ‘realm of reasoning private persons’…” (Baynes, 2003, p. 
482). These institutions were made possible through the enactment of a variety of 
constitutional rights and liberties. The distinguishing features of this public sphere 
are that it is distinctive from the market, the family and the state, and is formed 
around collective reasoning on common interests (Barro, 2010; Baynes, 2003; 
Finlayson, 2005; Lupel, 2005; Mitzen, 2005). The increased global 
interconnectedness also gives rise to a global public sphere, which is broader, more 
complex, and increasingly transnational in nature. This suggests greater overlap in 
territories, polities, and national, regional and global public spheres, with a bearing 
on the domestic public policy processes. 
The historical landscape presented above provides a backdrop within which to 
situate the debates surrounding the aid effectiveness agenda. David Booth offers a 
succinct summary of the historical justification and evolutional challenges facing the 
provision of foreign aid, and the aid effectiveness agenda, as follows: 
The aid effectiveness agenda has been linked historically with the view that 
the poorest countries, and those in Africa in particular, are primarily short of 
funds. The Paris commitments were accompanied in the mid-2000s by a 
political bidding-up of donor aid budgets in relation to donor ability to pay as 
measured by Gross National Income, with little attention to absorptive 
capacity or institutional impacts, and a growing tendency to downgrade 
agencies’ own human resources and skills for in-country work. (David Booth, 
2011, p. 13) 
Numerous theorists have argued that the conditions which may have necessitated 
foreign aid have either changed, for instance in some cases domestic revenue in 
poorer countries are not as dire as they were, when foreign aid was originally 
justified (Booth, 2011). Or alternatively, that the incentives underlying aid flows are 
more complex than would be implied by the simplistic logic proffered in global aid 
debates, which tout aid-flows as ‘the transfer of funds from richer to poorer countries’ 
to assist in poverty reduction. To illustrate this point, Alesina and Dollar (2000) found 
significant evidence to support the hypothesis that patterns of aid flows have been 
“…dictated in large part by political and strategic considerations” (Alesina, & Dollar, 
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2000, p.1). From an analysis of OECD data between the years 1970 to 1994, Alesina 
and Dollar also concluded that for the United States of America, Japan and France 
“aid allocations may be very effective at promoting strategic interests, but the result 
is that bilateral aid has only a weak association with poverty, democracy, and good 
policy” (Alesina, & Dollar, 2000, p.55). 
Another conclusion drawn from Alesina and Dollar’s (2000) study, which is of interest 
to the issue of global governance and was derived with demonstrable care for 
statistical bias, is the correlation between the proxy variable for ‘donor strategic 
interests’ titled UN-Friends, and aid patterns. The UN-Friends variable was 
generated using data gathered from UN voting patterns records. Alesina and Dollar 
provided the following interpretation following their data analysis,  
“…donors favour their "friends" in disbursing aid, and an observable 
manifestation of "friendship" is the pattern of UN votes. This view would then 
imply that an exogenous change in UN votes would indicate a change in the 
pattern of geopolitical alliances that would bring about a change in aid 
pattern.”(Alesina, & Dollar, 2000, p. 46) 
This discussion provides a strong foundation, to put forward the following argument: 
if aid is so controversial and potentially harmful to the realisation of development in 
poorer countries, then it must follow logically that it has outlived its usefulness. 
However, a counterargument to this logic has been provided by David Booth (2011), 
who sees a window of opportunity for an evolution in the aid effectiveness agenda, in 
a way that could potentially reclaim its diminishing usefulness, under the present 
conditions. 
He recommends that development theorists and practitioners need to return to the 
original insights that inspired the earlier-stages of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
specifically the recognition of the central role that endogenous country ownership 
plays in the achievement of development success (Booth, 2011). Booth argues that 
this recognition… 
“…commits us to seeking out and recognising the most likely drivers of 
development effort in poor countries.…the kind of insights into alternative 
avenues of political self-interest and the logics of decision-making they entail 
are essential if external and domestic actors are to target their governance 
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campaigns well. In particular, they are critical to avoiding doing harm by 
promoting ‘best practice’ initiatives that have ideological appeal but do not 
correspond to the real challenges a country is facing.”(Booth, 2011, p. 10) 
When one follows the issues and arguments that arise from the history and evolution 
of aid and the nation-state it becomes apparent that  there is a need to change 
certain aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda. The implication is that, revisions 
may not offer easier approaches and, or solutions. 
2.1.2. Ownership,	Partnerships	and	Deliberative	Democracy	
The historical and conceptual arguments on state sovereignty and aid effectiveness, 
outlined in the paragraphs above, segues into a discussion on the ideals and 
challenges, for the endogenous ownership of development policies, by the 
aforementioned sovereign/‘donor recipient’ states. 
The principle of commitment to Ownership, as defined in the Paris Declaration, has 
been advanced as a mechanism for ensuring that there is “…a constructive 
relationship between aid and political commitment to development goals at (aid-
recipient) country level” (Booth, 2011, p. 1). The 2008 Paris Declaration issued 
strong statements, based on evidence available at the time, emphasising Country 
Ownership as one of the three topmost challenges to be overcome if donor recipient 
countries were to achieve aid effectiveness. 
Some of the literature suggests that the Paris Declaration’s notion of ownership 
tends to come into conflict with institutional realities of the democratisation process 
within emerging democracies, and that this has consequences for the delivery of 
public goods (Booth, 2011a; Faust, 2010). Booth (2011a) captures the conflict 
succinctly when he argues that, “Democratisation is an inevitably extended process 
and the contribution it eventually makes, in the best of cases, to the adequacy of 
provision of key public goods is iterative and experimental.” (Booth, 2011a, p. s19) 
It must also be considered therefore, that since democratisation promotes pluralism, 
this will probably lead to growth in the plurality of interests within a society. However, 
not all of these interests will have the patience or interest, in trading-off the 
immediate gratification of service delivery demands, in favour of enabling the 
evolution and maturity of the iterative and experimental policy-making processes, 
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which is characteristic of an emerging democracy. As such, Faust (2010) argues that 
instead of the more simplistic understanding of democratisation, as a process that 
enables the eliminations of conflict in the policymaking process, an alternative is a 
more nuanced understanding of the policymaking process, with democratisation as 
the backdrop. 
The Ownership principle agreed during the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, commits Partner Countries to “Exercise leadership in developing and 
implementing their national development strategies through broad consultative 
processes” (OECD, 2005 & 2008, p. 3). In so doing, what is understood as an all 
“encompassing ownership of policy content” (Faust, 2010, p. 525), is then presented 
as a precursor to aid effectiveness, as opposed to an outcome of development 
effectiveness. However, social scientist Jörg Faust (2010) argues that this is an 
overly ambitious expectation. His argument is premised on the observation that, at 
best “Ownership in established democracies is mostly limited to procedural 
ownership – a consensus about core institutional features of democracy and 
individual rights.” (Faust, 2010, p. 530). 
In other words, Faust (2010) is arguing that ownership is not based on a conditional, 
all-encompassing agreement on the minutiae of the policy content in established 
democracies; rather, it is based on procedural ownership. In this paper procedural 
ownership is understood as, “…the common acceptance of basic principles and 
institutional features of democracy that guide policy processes.” (Faust, 2010, p 
526). 
Faust (2010) argues for a more progressive approach which views ownership as an 
outcome of development assistance. Such that ownership is not limited to mere 
consensus on the content of policy, which tends to be volatile within a democratic 
regime where political competition necessitates regular iterations to policy content. 
Alternatively, he advocates for a shift in the aid effectiveness agenda towards a 
broader preoccupation with the issue of political and administrative transparency.  
He (Faust, 2010) argues that this shift would demonstrate a move towards a more 
congruent recognition of the conflict that exists between the Paris Declaration 
definition of country ownership, and democratisation. This is because, while“…the 
advantage of democratic settings consists in inclusive competition, which generates 
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complex, iterative and experimental policy processes…” (Faust, 2010, p. 51). In 
addition to this, is the observation that “…policy ownership, in emerging democracies 
(is where) the political search for the encompassing interest will be even more 
experimental and volatile because of the distributional conflicts and co-ordination 
problems inherent in democratisation. (Faust, 2010, p. 527). 
This does not create an environment conducive for the Paris Declarations Alignment 
principle, which requires donors to “Base their overall support – country strategies, 
policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes – on partners’ national 
development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these 
strategies” (OECD, 2005& 2008, p. 3). Consequently this turns the reconciliation of: 
the narrow interpretation of ownership; the democratisation process; and, the 
advancement of aid effectiveness, into a significantly challenging endeavour. This 
then undermines efforts to achieve aid effectiveness through the development 
policymaking processes, within emerging democracies. 
It has been established that the principles underlying the achievement of aid 
effectiveness within these aid-recipient sovereign states have been the subject of 
debate over several decades, with shifting focus on particular issues, definitions and 
resolutions. This paper tracks two of the five principles in the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness namely, ownership and partnerships. David Booth (2011) posits 
that the 2008 Declaration was based on lessons learnt over several decades, which 
at the time had culminated in the realisation that “…development depends primarily 
on efforts at the country level, and that aid needs to focus on facilitating these efforts, 
not on trying to replace them (Booth, 2011, p. 3). 
In tracking the history of the two principles further, Mizanur Rahman (2011) posits 
that the origins of the conceptualisation of the ownership principle can be traced to 
the early 1990’s; following lessons learnt from the “…marginal impact of Bank-Fund 
development strategies” (Rahman, 2011, p. 45). According to Rahman (2011), some 
of the influential voices that contributed to this conceptualisation include a former 
World Bank President, James Wolfensohn. “Wolfensohn defined ownership as 
saying that the country must set the agenda through a fruitful public debate where 
stakeholders participated and the entire process of agenda setting was transparent” 
(Rahman, 2011, p. 45). 
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Up to this point it has been established the conflict that exists in the two-track 
accomplishment of aid effectiveness on one hand, and democratisation on the other, 
with social benefits as the nexus (Booth, 2011, Faust, 2010). Therefore it can be 
argued that if democracy is to be the bedrock upon which countries can optimise 
their chances of achieving development objectives, while concurrently receiving aid 
and pursuing democratisation, it is imperative to look into the democracy theories, 
upon which these conflicting objectives can potentially contribute towards optimal 
developmental outcomes. 
Deliberative Democracy 
In an interview between Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon and Dr. Benjamin Isakhan on 
Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell’s book titled ‘The Secret History of Democracy’, 
Isakhan speaks of two overarching schools of thought, regarding how democracy 
should be defined, along a continuum (Isakhan& Gagnon, 2010; Stadelmann-
Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). On the one hand Isakhan identifies a group of views that 
offer a “…minimalist, almost scientific definition of democracy” (Isakhan& Gagnon, 
2010); to which he subscribes the work of theorists like Thomas Hobbes, Joseph 
Schumpeter and John Rawls; whom he posits advanced the tenets of democracy, 
while overlooking concerns with the power of the elite members of a society. On the 
other hand, Isakhan identifies another school of thought, which he categorises as 
Habermasian and whom, he argues, places the active involvement of the people in 
decision-making, at the centre of their definition of democracy (Isakhan& Gagnon, 
2010). This school of thought includes theorists like Jürgen Habermas (who inspires 
the category title), and Ernesto Laclau. The common denominator in these schools 
of thought however, is three fundamental tenets of democracy namely: the people’s 
willingness to participate; equality in people’s access to information, freedoms and 
rights; and, some form of civil virtue which enables citizens to be part of the 
democracy (Isakhan & Gagnon, 2010). 
Another distinction that has been made, in relation to the different theoretical schools 
of thought on democracy, has been on the basis of the logic that underlies the 
delegation of power in democracy theories (Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). 
This perspective is issued in the Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag’s (2011) study, 
which is an enquiry into the impact of power delegation logic on the propensity to 
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engage as a volunteer in civic organisations, analysed at the individual level. In the 
study power delegation is related to democracy models as follows, 
“…different models of democracy are characterized by different dominant 
logics of power delegation, either based on a delegation of powers away from 
the citizen (the liberal or representative-delegative logic) or to the citizen (the 
participatory-inclusive logic). (Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011, p. 528). 
The Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag (2011) study, a quantitative study, is used here 
simply to illustrate some of the problems that have been identified in the 
conceptualisation of deliberative democracy theory. It is founded on a modelling 
approach to the two schools of thought on deliberative democracy, whereby, 
Isakhan’s (Isakhan & Gagnon, 2010) Minimalist/Scientific approach corresponds with 
the Representative democracy model and the Habermasian approach corresponds 
with the Direct democracy model. 
The study presented preliminary results in support of several propositions. That the 
adoption of more purist democratic models improves the propensity for individual 
voluntary civic engagement, for both the representative and direct models of 
democracy. While the study also suggests that, a mixture of the two models reduces 
the propensity for individual voluntary civic engagement, as illustrated in Figure 1 
(Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). However, the authors also stressed that from 
their investigations “…a direct democracy in its pure form does not actually exist in 
reality” (Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011, pp 530), and that “…most countries 
are dominated by the pure representative logic of democracy, with some allowing for 
limited elements of direct democratic participation (Scarrow, 2001)” (as cited in 
Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011, p. 531). These two additional findings 
suggested a bias towards representative models of democracy in the real world. 
However, the study does not illuminate the reasons for this bias, especially given 
that both models produce uniform outcomes, when adopted in their purist forms. 
Page 17 of 100 
 
 
Figure 1:Hypothesised influence of the model of democracy on civic engagement. Reprinted from “Making Civil Society 
Work: Models of Democracy and Their Impact on Civic Engagement”, by I. Stadelmann‐Steffen, and M. Freitag, 2011, 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40, 3, p.534 .Copyright 2011 by the Authors. Reprinted with permission. 
Although the study does not make an explicit case in support of, or against, either of 
the two models, that is, in so far as they relate to civic engagement. The study does 
however suggest that hybrid democracies models may have a reverse relationship 
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with individual level voluntary civic engagement, such that the more hybrid the model 
the less individual level civic engagement and vice versa, “…because the two modes 
of democracy follow very different mechanisms” (Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 
2011, p. 543). 
In effect the study serves to uphold the legitimacy of the democracy models in their 
pure form, which the study also indicates is not altogether practical in the real world. 
The study is not able to deal with the more substantive concerns in relation to the 
variability of the real world context of democracy. The model approach requires the 
study to hold all other factors constant, when analysing the relationship between 
these two democracy models and the propensity for voluntary civic engagement. As 
such, the Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag (2011) study has been used in this paper, 
to illuminate the limitations that modelling places on the conceptualisation of 
democracy theory. 
In a paper presented at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Mark Warren (Warren, 2012) recognises that the modelling approach to 
understanding democracy theory has had its advantages in that, at its best, it 
enables clear normative and corollary claims which, permitted theoretical 
comparison and, can be related to identifiable political institutions and a range of 
contexts. However, Mark Warren (2012) also recognises that models approach to 
democracy theory has had the effect of retarding development in democratic theory 
more broadly, and deliberative democracy more specifically. He does not propagate 
a departure from the democratic models thinking, without offering a similarly track-
able alternative in the form of a systems approach to democratic theory. Warren 
(2012) argues instead “…in favour of a problem-focused, functionalist approach. 
[Whereby] we need to ask what political systems need to accomplish in order to 
count as “democracies.” (Warren, 2012, p. 17) 
The exploration of the modelling and functionalist approaches to democratic theory, 
provide some insight into the intellectual debates surrounding the evolution of this 
theory. However, neither the modelling nor the functionalist approaches to 
democratic theory make a strong argument in support of, or against, the spectrum of 
schools of thought on democracy theory. In the context of this study, which 
endeavours to understand the ways in which engagement emerges between public 
officials and locally based development practitioners in donor agencies within the 
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context of Malawi, the following argument is advanced in favour of a deliberative 
approach to democracy because 
“Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the need to justify decisions 
made by citizens and their representatives …In a democracy, leaders should 
therefore give reasons for their decisions, and respond to the reasons that 
citizens give in return ...Its first and most important characteristic, then, is its 
reason-giving requirement.” (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 3) 
If, like Simone Chambers (2003), a proponent of deliberative democracy, one 
subscribes to the argument that the legitimacy of a political order can be measured 
by its ability to justify itself to all those governed by its laws (notwithstanding the 
multiplicity of interests emanating from all those governed); one can also argue that 
this justification includes being accountable for public policy. It is this process of 
justification, which Chambers  sees as an extension of representative democracy as 
opposed to being separate from, that promotes deliberative democracy as an 
approach with the potentiality of resulting in “…a more complex and richer 
interpretation” (Chambers, 2003, p. 308) of the citizenry’s consent, and beyond this 
the legitimacy of the outcomes of deliberation. 
The 2010 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) Malawi Country Report highlights 
the democratic challenges facing the country, which illuminates the value of 
deliberative democracy in the Malawi context. The report stated that “…the 
persistent failure of the government to organize local council elections has 
contributed to a “democratic deficit.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, p. 11). For the 
purposes of this study ‘democratic deficiency’ is understood as“…a situation where 
democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of 
fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation” (Nabatchi, 2010, 
p. 378). 
Some of the ideological features of the state, with a bearing on engagement on 
public policy, have been explored in part. There are some more structural features of 
the state that also warrant exploration so as to present a solid foundation for the 
exploration of the research topic. The inner workings of some of the institutions that 
facilitate engagement on development policy are explored to gain a better 
understanding of the structural features. One of the study’s target populations is 
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public officials situated in public institutions. They are bound, in principal, by certain 
institutional rules which are supposed to guide their engagement with external 
development actors (this includes locally based donor agency practitioners) on 
development policy, among other objectives.  
Blessings Chinsinga (2010) highlights how between 1964 and 1994 under one party 
rule, patronage politics (which were present but controlled) in Malawi did not take 
precedence over the policy process. Incongruously from 1994 under multiparty rule, 
Malawi experienced a collapse in the capacity for policy formulation and 
implementation. Patronage politics began to take precedence over policy, to the 
detriment of the professional civil service. Chinsinga (2010) also highlights how 
under multiparty rule the civil service nurtured during the one party rule, were set 
aside and rendered defunct placing a higher priority on patronage politics, at the 
expense of policy formulation and implementation. Whereas under the one party 
rule, they had been strategically engaged and dismissed, for the benefit of the ruling 
elite. The formerly professionalised bureaucracy began to transform into an 
institution that placed a premium on party loyalty over professionalism, paving the 
way for widespread corruption (Chinsinga, 2010). This historical account 
demonstrates a converse relationship between bureaucratic professionalism and a 
strong public policy process. 
Chinsinga (2010) also explores the role of donors operating within this deteriorating 
policy processes, following the advent of multiparty politics in 1994. He argues that 
donors exploited the situation by their own adoption of this dysfunctional and short-
sighted approach to public policy, in their local level engagement on development 
policy (Chinsinga, 2010). Chinsinga argues that, “…consequently, competing views, 
interests and demands among donors have substantially compromised policy 
coherence, and subjected policy-making and implementation to often polarised 
ideological leanings and orientations” (Chinsinga, 2010, p. 88). The significance of 
these structural features of Malawi’s public policy space, as stated by James 
Anderson is because “…decisions that are made without adequate consideration of 
their technical aspects or that conflict with strong professional advice may turn out to 
be faulty on both technical and political grounds” (Anderson, 2011, p. 234). 
Some of the key ideological and structural features, as well as limitations to 
engagement on development policy have been highlighted, and situated in the 
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Malawi context. The next logical step is to further explore the potential of deliberative 
democracy as a viable ideological underpinning for engagement on development 
policy. Following the debates that have been presented above regarding the 
conceptual and contextual aspects of deliberative democracy, this section proceeds 
with an exploration of the viability of institutional designs associated with deliberative 
democracy; and their consequent implications for development policy. Nabatchi 
(2010) argues that  
“…on the whole, deliberative processes engage and transform individual 
preferences and values such that policy decisions represent more than the 
aggregation of individual interests. In doing so, deliberative democracy provides 
institutional designs that might allow public administration to better rediscover 
and reflect the publicness in public affairs”. (Nabatchi, 2010, p. 386) 
Earlier in the paper the discussion revolved around the evolution in democracy 
theory advancing the debates surrounding deliberative democracy from the 
modelling to the systems approach to democratic theory, in a bid to arrive at a 
democratic theory which is more reflective of the real world complexities. 
Mansbridge, Bohman, Chambers, Christiano, Fung, Parkinson, Thompson, and 
Warren, (2012), proponents of the systematic approach to deliberative democracy, 
highlight some of the pathologies of the deliberative system that may act as barriers 
to the realisation of political institutions which mirror the ideals of a deliberative 
democratic system. One of these pathologies stems from the need for the 
deliberative system to be anchored on a number of strong and decoupled 
institutions, so as to mitigate against institutional dominance by one or a few of the 
deliberative democratic institutions over the others; in so doing undermining the 
processes and ideals of the deliberative system (Mansbridge, et. al., 2012). 
However, to conclude the point on the viability of deliberative institutional designs, it 
is important to be reminded that as an extension of as opposed to an alternative to 
representative democracy and its associated institutions. “Deliberative democratic 
theory is a normative theory that suggests ways in which we can enhance 
democracy and criticize institutions that do not live up to the normative [democracy] 
standard.” (Chambers, 2003, p. 308). 
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Nabatchi (2010) wraps up the discussion on the potentially reinforcing relationship 
between ownership of public policy, expressed and realised through political 
commitment, and the legitimacy of the deliberative democracy ideals. 
“…deliberative democracy processes also have instrumental benefits that 
may help public administration to effectively address the citizenship and 
democratic deficits within the modern environment of networked and 
collaborative governance structures. Moreover, deliberative democracy offers 
institutional designs that may help the field rediscover the role of the public in 
shaping societal affairs and, in doing so, abate the inherent tensions between 
bureaucratic and democratic ethos (Nabatchi, 2010, p.392). 
 
2.2. Literature	pertaining	to	Research	Sub‐Questions	1	and	2	
The first sub-question is exploring the role that the evolving global partnership 
commitments play in the engagement between public officials and practitioners, on 
development policy in Malawi. While the final sub-question explores the effects of 
engagement on development policy between public officials and practitioners in 
Malawi. 
Several, global and regional development cooperation agreements exist which have 
been established to facilitate the formation of partnerships for development. the 
following definitions for the terms cooperation and collaboration are used in this 
study: collaboration is a broader and more ambiguous term used in reference to the 
forming of strategic alliances, in this study collaboration is defined as “a powerful 
strategy to achieve a vision otherwise not possible to obtain as independent entities 
working alone” (Gajda, 2004, p. 76). The slightly more tangible term cooperation is 
defined as, the “joint pursuit of agreed-on goal(s) in a manner corresponding to a 
shared understanding about contributions and payoffs” (Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & 
Zhelyazkov, 2012, p. 533). As such partnerships are also viewed as an alliance 
strategy for cooperation and collaborative. 
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Figure 2: Defining strategic alliances across a continuum of integration. Reprinted from “Utilizing Collaboration Theory 
to Evaluate Strategic Alliances”, by R. Gajda, 2004, Nonprofit American Journal of Evaluation, 25, 1, p.69 
In the case of North-South Cooperation, its related initiatives began with the intention 
of building consensus towards the achievement of the Aid Effectiveness agenda, 
however contemporary discourse suggests that there is an emerging shift in agenda 
towards Development Effectiveness through economic growth (Hughes, & 
Hutchison, 2011; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2012; McEwan, & Mawdsley, 2012). 
This has been attributed in part to the evolving context of development and foreign 
aid, the reshaping geopolitics and the world economy. More specifically, in the wake 
of the economic crisis which occurred between the 2005 Paris and 2008 Accra High 
Level Forums. This shift in the global, and as a result local, partnership agenda has 
its own set of implications, opportunities, challenges and risks for national level 
engagement on development policy, and ultimately the delivery of development 
outcomes for the poor and vulnerable populations in the less developed countries. 
The 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) is most probably the more widely recognised High 
Level Forum (HLF) on Global Partnership (Hayden, 2008; Hughes, & Hutchison, 
2011; Kaufmann, 2009). The PD, like the 2002 Rome Declaration before it, was 
aimed at reforming the aid effectiveness environment and outcomes. However, the 
distinguishing feature of the PD is that specific commitments were agreed, which 
were explicitly identified for both the donor and aid recipient countries (The High 
Level Fora, n.d.).Two more HLF’s, have been held following the 2005 PD namely, 
the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and the more recent 2011 Busan Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (The High Level Fora, n.d.). 
Among the array of global partnerships commitments ranging from those with a 
global, continental and regional reach, the study concentrates on the 2008 Paris 
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Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which is framed around the management of foreign 
aid. This is because it endeavours to commit developing countries, who are 
recipients’ of development aid, to “…broaden country-level policy dialogue on 
development” (OECD, 2008, p. 16). In so doing the Paris Declaration assumes that if 
developing countries broadened policy dialogue on development, this will lead to 
strengthened country ownership of the development agenda and related polices, as 
well as the realisation of development results, and a growing body of literature exists 
challenging this theory of change. One of the challenges to this theory is the 
assumption that democratic ownership is the key ingredient to development success, 
and the case is made based on numerous interrogations into the more recent case 
of China’s undemocratic development successes (Faust, 2010; Mawdsley, et. 
al.2012).  
Another hypothesis underlying the Paris Declaration, is the assumption that a 
commitment to, and emphasis on, the principles of Ownership; Alignment; 
Harmonisation; Managing for Results; and Mutual Accountability, will result in more 
effective partnerships. Faust (2010), challenges this logic with the argument that this 
set of principles are“…not only ill-suited for contexts of state failure. They are also at 
least partly misleading with regard to political processes in democratic settings, 
thereby further limiting the applicability of the model outlined for donor-recipient 
relations (Faust, 2010, p. 516). 
The Paris Declaration does not interrogate the continued justification for aid, in the 
first instance, what Mawdsley, et. al. (2012) refer to as the ‘post-aid world’. However, 
literature reveals that the objectives and outcomes of development and foreign aid 
for development, have received scathing reviews within the development literature. 
“Development was – and continues to be for the most part – a top-down, 
ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures 
as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the 
charts of “progress”. Development was conceived not as a cultural process 
(culture was a residual variable, to disappear with the advancement of 
modernization) but instead as a system of more or less universally applicable 
technical interventions intended to deliver some “badly needed goods to a 
“target” population. It comes as no surprise that development became a force 
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so destructive to Third World cultures, ironically in the name of people’s 
interests.” (Escobar, p. 44, 1995) 
In a study, assessing the degree of aid dependence, in aid recipient countries 
between the 1960’s to the 2000’s, as well as, their likelihood of exiting from a 
situation of aid dependence (Hailu, & Shiferaw, 2012), Malawi was assessed as 
being comparatively more aid dependent in the 2000’s than it was in the 1960’s. The 
country was also assessed as less likely to graduate from aid dependency, unless 
relevant policy actions, directed at graduating from aid, are taken. Out of the five 
Paris Declaration commitments to Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing 
for Results and Mutual Accountability, Malawi performed the lowest under the 
commitments to Alignment and Managing for Results (A Country Evaluation of the 
Paris Declaration for Malawi, 2012). 
The Paris Declaration includes a subset commitment, within its overall commitments, 
to the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations” (OECD 2005 & 2008, p. 19). This subset of ten principles of engagement, 
which are specific to fragile states and situations, recognises that there are states 
and or situations within the wider developing country classification, which are 
definitively fragile and therefore require a modified approach to engagement on 
development. However, little guidance is provided on the definitive features of a 
fragile state, so that development practitioners are clear when to activate the 
principles for engagement when operating in a clearly distinguishable fragile state 
and or situation.  
Bertoli & Ticci, (2012) give two broad categories of fragility definitions. One of the 
categories draws its roots from global concerns with national security, while the other 
draws its roots from foreign donor concerns with the international aid performance-
based allocation (PBA) system. On one hand the definitions stemming from national 
security concerns, are based on the understanding that fragile states/situations are 
those states characterised by a context in which the state is unable to manage its 
own affairs, such that unrest begins to fester within the state’s boundaries. 
Subsequently, these circumstances have the potential to cultivate an increased 
likelihood or risk that the unrest spills over into neighbouring countries, turning these 
states into bad neighbours (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012).  
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While the definitions stemming from PBA concerns view fragile states/situations as 
those where the state, is unable to produce certain outcomes such as, the effective 
use of development assistance, poverty reduction, and sustainable growth, as 
measured by the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
(Bertoli & Ticci, 2012). These outcomes are normatively identified as “an ideal set of 
core policy objectives” (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012, p. 213). In these contexts there is a 
misalignment between these core policy objectives, supported by the donor 
community, and the outcomes of the state. Further to this, through aid platforms like 
OECD-DAC, donors began to allocate aid based on performance against these 
policy objectives, which resulted in poorly performing fragile states progressively 
receiving less aid based on the understanding that aid is less effective in fragile 
states/situations (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012). It is the debates challenging this reduction in 
aid based on performance that inspired the emergence of a category of fragility 
definitions around the PBA system. In summary, Bertoli and Ticci (2012) classified 
the two categories of fragility definitions as procedural and outcome-based 
definitions, however they also emphasise that there is still considerable ambiguity 
surrounding ‘a’ definition and its utility in engagement on development aid. 
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Figure 3: The World Bank Country Policy  Institutional Assessment 2013  score  for Malawi. Reprinted  from The World 
Bank  Data  Topics,  n.  d.,  Retrieved  January  10,  2015,  from  http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/country/malawi. 
Copyright 2015by The World Bank Group. Reprinted with permission. 
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Faria and Magalhães Ferreira highlight that that the term fragility generates 
uneasiness in sub-Saharan Africa, within which Malawi is situated, and the region 
from which most of the countries classified as fragile originate. This adds further 
complexity to the utility of this term as part of a set of guiding principles like the Paris 
Declaration (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012). 
“The uneasy feeling associated with being labelled as fragile is also clearly 
connected with the great amount of discretion that any underlying definition 
involves and with partner countries’ fear of the stereotypes and stigmatisation 
which can jeopardise their international image, investment climate and 
economic and development perspectives” (Faria and Magalhães Ferreira as 
cited in Bertoli and Ticci, 2012, p.218) 
Another critical point worth noting is the analytical gaps which are created by the 
ambiguity that exists in the definition of fragility. For instance the 2010 OECD Global 
Report monitoring the use of the ten fragile states engagement principles draws on a 
sample of six countries that have all experienced some form or the other of 
protracted internal conflict. This sampling bias, by and large, reflects the procedural 
definition of fragility and not the outcome-based definition of fragility. A brief analysis 
of the Malawi case suggests that it falls in the category of outcome-based fragility, as 
such it is difficult to use the findings of the 2010 report to either assess the state of 
these principles or to apply the conclusions and recommendations arrived at in the 
report. 
One of the other criticisms that have been levelled against the Paris Declaration, and 
other global partnership initiatives is, the degree to which it effectively takes into 
account the issues of the politics, power and trust that exist, between the donors and 
aid recipient’s (Hayden, 2008; Hughes, & Hutchison, 2011; Mawdsley, Savage, & 
Kim, 2012; McEwan, & Mawdsley, 2012). These are arguably difficult concepts to 
deal with, especially in the complex and evolving contexts, within which development 
cooperation occurs. The principles of engagement in fragile states or situations go 
some ways towards addressing the issues related to setting conditions for trust in 
engagement on development, specifically in fragile environments. However this 
section is so obscure and not as well publicised as the PD more generally that it’s 
practical application is unclear. A related criticism, which has been directed at the 
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Paris Declaration specifically, is its inability to adequately comprehend and take into 
account the “…political nature of development and foreign aid” (Mawdsley, Savage, 
& Kim, p. 1, 2012).  
Existing literature, on the fundaments underlying the global partnership commitment 
on aid, and its effects on country-level development policy, suggest the need for a 
developing country like Malawi, to gain a deeper understanding of effects of these 
commitments, debates and the resulting practices, within the Malawian context. 
2.3. Conclusion	to	the	Literature	Review	
Several conclusions have been drawn, from this exploration of the literature relating 
to engagement on development policy within the developing country-level, as well as 
the global commitments that have a bearing on this country level dialogue.  
This literature review begins with an exploration of the origins of the modern day 
state, which is based on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. However, the literature 
uncovers a body of thought, challenging Westphalia’s sustained reference and the 
usefulness of its model in view of contemporary concerns. Foremost, reference has 
been made to the contemporary concerns of globalisation, the multi-polarisation of 
the international community, as well as the evolution of the ‘aid architecture’ – 
defined as “…the totality of donors, instruments and strategic or political frameworks 
covering the specification and implementation of aid to developing countries 
(ECDPM, 2008, p. 2). 
Some of the challenges to the Westphalian model of the state include the argued 
effects of international law on the subordination of post-colonial states, rendering 
their sovereignty defunct. Other arguments include the unrelenting effects of 
colonialism, resulting in weak and economically dependent post-colonial states, like 
Malawi. The literature also provides arguments for a derivative of the Westphalian 
ideals, the nation-state. Arguments include a critique of the ideological dissonance 
between the notion of the nation-state and its realisation in the context of post-
colonial states.  
Related to this is the effect that a state’s ability to conform to the ideals of a nation 
state has, on its ability to engage effectively with the international community. Such 
that states with weak to nonexistent national identities, struggle to generate accord 
within their territorial boundaries. These states find it even tougher to aggregate that 
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accord on a regional, and continental level, as well as to be able to engage and 
interface with the rest of the global community. Another challenge to the Westphalian 
model relates to the point that was established earlier, in relation to the intrinsically 
weak African states formed during the 1884 Berlin conference. The formation of 
these weak states was not a solid basis for the ideals of a Westphalian model.  
It can be argued that development policy is one of the mechanisms for generating 
nation-level accord. However, this literature review suggests that the fundamentals, 
underlying the formation of states like Malawi, contain inherent constraints to the 
formulation of effective development policy. This is further compounded by the 
interconnected context within which these development policies are generated, 
which transcends national territorial boundaries. This further suggests that these 
nation-level constraints must be carefully understood, by development practitioners, 
so that they can ensure that they are deliberately accounted for and/or mitigated 
against, when trying to contribute to strengthening of the development policy 
formulation processes. 
The problem statement also highlights the contemporary predicament of 
development problems becoming more interconnected, and therefore requiring 
interconnected solutions from a multiplicity of actors. A prominent framework for 
development problem-solving in the global, regional and national arena is that of 
partnerships. The literature establishes that the fundamentals which led to the 
creation of states did not lead to the emergence of equivalent states. So, if the 
partners within partnerships for development are states, then the literature suggests 
that these partnerships are not formed between equivalent partners. This further 
suggests the potential for the existence of asymmetrical partnerships in the pursuit of 
addressing interconnected development problems. The logic in this conclusion is 
supported by the numerous criticisms, levelled against the partnership principles 
contained in global aid effectiveness partnership exemplified in this paper using the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
The literature also uncovers in-depth arguments demanding a re-justification of the 
provision of foreign aid by richer countries to poorer countries, based upon 
reflections on the changes to the original context which necessitated the provision of 
aid. Other arguments for the re-justification of aid stem from the need to make aid 
more meaningful while meeting the objective of ‘doing-no-harm’ setting the stage for 
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genuine, and not just rhetorical, aid-effectiveness. These debates around the 
justifications and objectives of aid have a common strand that runs through them: the 
pursuit of a deeper understanding of the basis and impacts of foreign aid on the 
development outcomes in developing countries like Malawi. This paper looks at an 
aspect of this quest for development effectiveness, through the lens of engagement 
on development policy at the country level, while situating this country level 
engagement in a wider context of historical, multidimensional governance, and 
power contestation considerations. The literature suggests that both the bases and 
objectives of aid may contain inherent constraints, which have the potential of 
obscuring the formulation processes and outcomes of development policies, in 
developing country contexts. 
In the interest of exploring the role of global partnership commitments in engagement 
between the two identified actors, aid providers and aid recipients, (who in principle 
are also represented as equivalent partners in partnership frameworks), on 
development policy, the study delves into the global partnership commitment on aid 
effectiveness – the Paris Declaration. the discussion explores the role of ownership 
in development policy, as envisaged by the Paris Declaration, as well as, the 
declaration’s inadequate consideration of the effects of democratisation processes 
upon the consolidation of the policy-making processes. The significance of this 
finding in the literature, as it relates to the problem statement suggests a need for the 
following considerations: engagement between development practitioners on 
development policy needs to be cognisant of the role, options and alternatives 
surrounding democratisation processes, as they relate to the formulation of 
development policy in a developing country context like Malawi. Particularly since the 
literature indicates that development policy, formulated in isolation of the democratic 
realities of a country, can potentially render the policy ineffective. 
Other criticisms levelled at the Paris Declaration include its narrow recognition of 
politics, power and trust in the formulation and subsequent implementation of 
development policy, in most the developing country contexts. These criticisms relate 
directly to the main question of this study that explores the ways in which 
engagement on development policy emerge between development practitioners 
situated in the Malawi government and those situated in donor agencies. The 
literature indicates that the imbalance in stature of the states, from which the country 
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level practitioners and local officials originate, may have a bearing on the nature and 
quality of their engagement. Since this engagement is a means to formulating 
development policy, then this further suggests that the asymmetric engagement may 
also influence the resultant development policy. Based on the understanding that this 
asymmetrical engagement has the potential to translate into asymmetrical influence, 
in the formulation of development policy. 
This review does not simply adopt a problematised approach; it also adopts a 
solution-driven approach to the literature. The review explores the features of 
deliberative democracy and the various debates surrounding the evolution of the 
theory. Discussions on the evolution of the theory include the progression in the 
theory from a modelling approach to the theory to a systems approach. The review 
also explores the potential that deliberative democracy has to help mitigate some of 
the conundrums facing the development and legitimacy of development policy in the 
aid-recipient, developing-country context. 
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3. Research	Methodology	and	Data	Collection	
3.1. Research	Strategy	
The research strategy (Bryman, 2012), applied by this research is the qualitative 
research strategy. This decision is based on the understanding that the study intends 
to understand the engagement that exists between the public officials and 
development practitioners, on development policy in Malawi.  
The literature review that has been undertaken for this study provides a series of 
observations, on the nature of engagement that occurs within the development and 
foreign aid context (Escobar, p. 44, 1995, Hailu, & Shiferaw, 2012; Hayden, 2008; 
Hughes, & Hutchison, 2011; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2012; McEwan, & 
Mawdsley, 2012). This line of enquiry lends itself to inductive theory (Bryman, 2012); 
in that it is expected that the consequence of this enquiry, which will begin with 
observations of the nature of engagement between public officials and development 
practitioners on development policy and aid effectiveness; should result in the 
construction of some form of theory. However, it is important to note from the onset, 
that the study will not be in a position to generalise the expected theory, derived from 
this enquiry, due mainly to the size and scope of our study.  
The body of knowledge, upon which this study is premised, is that of Interpretivism 
(Bryman, 2012), because the study endeavours to understand how the public 
officials and development practitioners, interpret their engagement on development 
policy in Malawi. This study is conducted from a position of understanding, as 
opposed to quantifying or measuring the concept of stakeholder engagement. 
Finally, the ontological orientation upon which this study will be conducted is that of 
constructivism (Bryman, 2012). This is because the study intends on exploring 
engagement as a social interaction, as well as the impressions that public officials 
and practitioners have in relation to this interaction. This exploration is based upon 
the underlying assumption that the public officials and development practitioners, 
also recognised as social actors, give meaning to the social interaction that occurs 
within the development space, and that they may also influence the way that 
interaction occurs.  
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3.2. Research	Design	
The research design employed for this study is a Case Study, more specifically an 
Exemplifying case study (Bryman, p. 70). The main justification for this classification 
is the parameters of the study, as the research intends on exploring the engagement 
of public officials and practitioners, within a specific constituency. The constituency in 
this case, are the sections of the public service that engages public officials and 
development practitioners, specifically the line ministries the Government, 
international donor agencies and civil society organisations. 
The unit of analysis in this research is the social interaction, established as 
engagement, between the public officials and development practitioners.  
3.3. Research	Method&	Procedure	
This study adopts a two phase method, as follows; 
a. Literature and Document Review 
This phase was iterative and continued throughout the research process. It included 
the conduct of a desk research and the compilation of a literature review. This phase 
of the study provided the bulk of the literature that informed the development of 
formal interview materials, and the identification of key participants to be recruited in 
the study. 
b. Interviews  
The interview phase used semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 2012) conducted with 
public officials and practitioners within donor-agencies and civil society 
organisations.  
1. The interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis with participants in 
Malawi;  
2. The researcher was the sole investigator conducting and transcribing the 
interviews; 
3. Listening is the key faculty drawn on during the conduct of the interviews; 
4. Data was collected in the form of handwritten notes and audio recordings where 
consent was duly obtained, and; 
5. The data was collected and stored with strict privacy and confidentiality. 
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3.4. Sampling	
This section describes the way that data was collected within the target population of 
this research. It outlines the details of the sampling frame and sampling method for 
this study.  
Population 
The population of this research is the Public Sector in Malawi because this is one of 
the primary places in the public sphere, where engagement on development policy 
occurs, as illustrated below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sampling frame and Sampling Method 
The type of sampling used in this study is Generic Purposive Sampling (Bryman, 
2012). There are two sampling units implied by the research question, which are a) 
organisations within the public sector and b) staff within these public sector 
organisations. There are two sampling frames (Bryman, 2012) that are required by 
the research question which are a) the sampling of the context or context sample 
population i.e. public sector organisations and b) the sampling of the participants or 
participant sample population i.e. staff. The purposive sampling technique that was 
used is Typical Case Sampling, as a result the context and participants represent 
typified dimensions of this research inquiry on engagement on development policy, 
among specified development actors.  
Public Sector Population 
Civil Society 
Organisations 
Cluster 
International 
Donor Agencies 
Cluster 
Government 
Line Ministries 
Cluster Staff
CONTEXT
Staff
Staff
PARTICIPANT
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Three clusters of organisations were purposively selected within the context sample 
population, namely: i) Civil Society Organisations, ii) Executive Branch/Government 
Line Ministries, and iii) International Donor Agencies, based on their relevance to the 
research question. While the sampling of staff from the participant sample 
population, who “…exemplifying the population under consideration” (Bryman, p. 
417, 2012), was based on the relevance, of those participants in the organisations, 
to the research question.  
Therefore to determine the appropriate context, established as organizations within 
the public sector clusters, and the appropriate participants, established as staff in the 
select public sector organizations, the relevance at both levels is assessed based on 
the following criteria: the relevance of the organisations in the organisation clusters 
and the relevance of the participants in these organisations; and the knowledge, 
expertise and experience that the organisations and participants have of working on 
development policy in Malawi. The application of the above criteria to arrive at the 
sampling of participants, is detailed below.  
 Public officials are sampled within the two Line Ministries that are central to 
engagement between public officials and practitioners on development policy, 
which were identified through work experience, network and interaction in the 
field. having worked for three development aid organisations in Malawi, 
namely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UK 
Department of International Development (DFID), and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), for over nine years, in the 
areas of Governance and Democracy. The two identified ministries are the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), and the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development (MEPD). 
 The development practitioners were sampled from within both the Civil 
Society Organisations and the International Donor Agencies, which were also 
identified based on personal work experience in the field.  
The total sample size is 15 research subjects distributed as follows; 
- Three public officials from the Ministries of Finance and Development 
Cooperation respectively, making a total of six participants; 
- Six development practitioners from the International Aid Agencies, and; 
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- Three development practitioners from the Civil Society Organisations. 
The minimum acceptable response rate is 70%, comprising the following mix of 
participants; 
- Two public official from the Ministries of Finance and Development 
Cooperation respectively, making a total of four participants; 
- Four development practitioners from the International Aid Agencies, and; 
- Two development practitioners from the Civil Society Organisations.  
3.5. Data	
This study used primary data, which was collected specifically for this research, 
through the conduct of eleven semi-structured interviews, with the research 
participants detailed in the sampling section. A total of 5 locally based donor 
practitioners, 4 public officials and 2 civil society organisation officials were 
interviewed. 
The semi-structured interviews were informed by an interview guide (provided in 
Annex 1), containing a combination of probing, specifying, direct and indirect 
questions, which were punctuated by follow-up questions at opportune moments in 
the interview process (Bryman, 2012). 
This facilitated the  collection of data with an open mind, enabling the formation of a 
deeper understanding of the effects of local engagement on development policy, 
through the use of this inductive approach to data collection (Bryman, 2012). All 
eleven interviews were recorded on tape, and the interviewer also took notes, while 
the interviews were in progress. The criteria adopted for assessing the quality of the 
data collection process is the evidence of ethical considerations, which include 
documentation like the signed consent forms discussed in the ethical considerations 
section below (Bryman, 2012). 
The data has been organised thematically, where a theme is understood as – a 
category identified in the data, relating to the research questions and formulated 
from a thorough review of the interview data (Bryman, 2012).The identified themes, 
are organised as they relate to the questions, and further broken down into 
subthemes, to flesh out the details under each theme. A combination of direct quotes 
and carefully paraphrased sentences (to sustain the voice of the interviewee), have 
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been placed in the cells, where the relevant sub-theme column and interviewee row 
converge. The point at which the column and row converges, will be referred to as a 
field, for purposes of this study.  
Since, the research targeted three categories of respondent’s, the data analysis 
table will clearly label each interviewee by category to incorporate the nuances in the 
perspectives from the three sectors, namely: government, donors and civil society. 
3.6. Data	Analysis	
This section sequentially details the data analysis techniques that have been 
employed in this study. 
3.7. Data	Analysis	Techniques	
The first step in the data analysis process was to check the collected primary data, 
sourced via semi-structured interviews, for any flaws or inaccuracies. This process 
included contacting the participants to seek further clarification, and remedy the 
problems identified in the data. 
The next step was to partially transcribe the interview transcripts, for those interviews 
where the electronic capture of data was most relevant to the research topic. This 
selective approach was taken in recognition of the time and financial constraints of 
conducting a complete transcription of all the eleven interviews. as such, selective 
transcription was adopted to mitigate these resource constraints. Each line of the 
sections have been read and reread, to draw out the themes emerging from the 
transcription data. The interviewees were coded to conceal their identity, and the 
population of the frameworks was based on the codes. 
To add to the transcription data, a review of the interview notes was conducted, as a 
cross reference, and to capture some of the themes that were identified during the 
conduct of the interview. Once all the themes were drawn out, these were 
categorised into broader themes, reducing the data even further. 
The subsequent step was to populate the relevant fields of the thematic analysis 
framework (Bryman, 2012) in Figure 2 below, with the reduced interview data. This is 
then followed by a review of each thematic framework, to identify patterns in the 
data. The search for patterns is for those appearing, within and across, the themes. 
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The identified patterns are the important ingredients in the formulation of the data 
analysis narrative, and form the basis for the research findings and conclusions. 
Table 1: Thematic Analysis Framework 
THEME TITLE 
 Sub-Theme 1 Sub-Theme 2 Etc. 
Interviewee 1    
Interviewee 2    
Interviewee 3    
Finally, this representation of the data is used to analyse the participants’ 
understanding of the research issues and questions. To instil further confidence in 
the research findings, a triangulation strategy was employed through the use of 
multiple data sources, theoretical perspectives and observers in the form of 
interviewees (Bryman, 2012). The multiple data sources were derived from the 
literature review exercise, which preceded and continued to be iterated, during the 
interview phase of the research. The literature review provides the critical 
background to the study, and forms the base upon which to build the interpretation of 
the study findings. 
The interviewees consist of a range of experts with academic backgrounds in, 
political science, economics, social science, and law. These multiple lenses support 
the triangulation of the data, through the different theoretical perspectives. Finally, 
the interviewees, who are also serving as our observers, have been picked from 
three triangulated sectors; government, donors and civil society. The nature of these 
sectors is forged around the provision of checks and balances, and the study draws 
upon the inherent characteristics of these sector perspectives, to aid in the 
triangulation of the data. In accordance with the ethical requirements of this study, 
the researcher endeavoured to remain conscious of the potential biases that may 
exist, as a result of the power differentials identified during the literature review, and 
the potential influence that it may have on triangulation by observers/interviewees. 
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The triangulation of data has assisted in refining the process of identifying patterns in 
the data, in addition to building confidence in the findings. 
3.8. The	Limitations	of	the	Research	
The three main limitations of this research are: time, in relation to the scope of the 
study; the potential for the researcher’s bias to influence the analysis and the 
findings of the study; and, the ability for the results of this research to be generalised.  
In relation to the time limitation, the depth of understanding of the study will be 
managed closely within the timeframe of the research. The researcher brings a 
wealth of experience and personal reflections on the research issues under study, 
which also has the potential to introduce bias in the interpretation of the findings. The 
researcher’s experience is from working within donor agencies and does not include 
work in the Government of Malawi or within civil society organisations in Malawi, 
potentially representing only one-dimension of this multi-dimensional study. To 
mitigate this, this research has included triangulated perspectives from three sectors 
government, donor agencies and civil society organisations.  
Additionally, to manage any potential conflicts of interest arising from the 
researcher’s professional orientation, the researcher included several measures to 
ensure a consistent adherence to the research standards of integrity, quality and 
transparency (ESRC’s Framework for Research Ethics, as cited by Bryman, 2012, 
p144) as follows; 
 The research questions and interview guide questions were formulated and 
iteratively reviewed and revised based on extensive literature review 
generated from a broad range of perspectives; to ensure the soundness and 
relevance of the questions, as well as to mitigate the potential bias of the 
researcher’s donor agency perspective. 
 The respondents were selected from three sectors to generate triangulated 
data, adding to the rigour of the data collected. The respondents were also 
selected purposefully based on their knowledge, academic qualifications and 
their years of experience engaging in the development policy process in 
Malawi, from the triangulated sectors. Informed consent (Bryman, 2012) was 
used to solicit participation by ensuring that they had sufficient information 
Page 41 of 100 
 
about the study and formal reassurance through the signing of a consent 
sheet that their contributions would be confidential. 
 All of the interviews were conducted using the interview guide which was 
structured to probe the respondents understanding of the concepts and 
processes under study. The consistent use of the interview guide ensured 
consistency in the conduct of the interviews as well as the collection of data 
from each respondent. To ensure the integrity and transparency of the data 
collected, and to enable their peer reviewed if required, each of the eleven 
interviews were recorded using a recording device and saved using a 
pseudonym to conceal the identity of the respondents and preserve their 
confidentiality. 
 To ensure consistent data analysis, all of interview data was systematically 
organised into the Thematic Analysis Framework. 
 When interpreting the data the research reflected on what this meant for the 
research questions. In addition to this the research also reflected on what this 
meant for the researcher, from a donor agency perspective. This approach 
was taken to consistently reflect on the distinction between the two objective 
and subjective perspectives, respectively and systematically. The researcher 
also ensured that crucial direct quotes, which captured the essence of the 
respondent’s voice, were included in the write-up of the interpretations to 
minimise bias. 
Throughout the conduct of this research, the researcher maintained a consistent and 
rigorous process of continual reflection alongside the application of the above 
identified research standards. The researcher was consistently cognisant of the 
potential bias that could occur based on the researcher’s professional background 
and perspective; however these biases were constantly acknowledged and 
challenged, as the research study unfolded to ensure a high level of scholarly rigour. 
Finally, by the very nature of case study research, this research does not claim to 
produce any generalisations, as such cannot be generalised. Although it is worthy to 
note that, the rigour in the detailing of the research design and method for this study, 
is aimed at providing the foundations for a criteria of evaluating this social research 
study. 
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3.9. Ethical	Considerations	
Prior to the commencement of the interview phase of the this research study, 
clearance was sought from the National Commission for Science and Technology in 
Malawi, who are mandated to evaluate research proposals of social research 
conducted in Malawi. The researcher was advised that since this study is in fulfilment 
of academic requirements, it would not require formal clearance; however that 
clearance will be required in the event that the research is published. 
Of particular concern in this study is that many of the research respondents are from 
institutions or hold public positions that are highly visible. Clear and established 
safeguards are employed to protect the rights of all research subjects. The research 
subjects were requested to complete a consent form, which provides the details of 
their participation, issues of confidentiality, risks, discomforts and the benefits related 
to the study. There is the significant issue of anonymity: it will be better if all 
respondents are named within the study.  
However, in the event that any respondent specifically requests that their identity be 
anonymous their wishes will be respected accordingly. The concern of power 
relations between the researcher and the interviewees is mitigated by the interviewer 
maintaining a constant and deliberate consciousness of the likelihood of power being 
a factor in the interview, and by the interviewer also adopting reflexivity, by way of 
methodological self-consciousness (Bryman, 2012). The researcher works for a 
donor agency that provides the largest portion of Malawi’s foreign aid, when the 
agencies funding is combined with other sister agencies funding; like the Centre for 
Disease Control – CDC, Millennium Challenge Account – MCA, and other agencies 
that together form the United States mission in Malawi. This has the potential of 
skewing the power balance between the researcher and the respondents, especially 
the respondents from government and civil society organisations, who might view the 
researcher as a potential funder. 
The first approach to mitigating this potential conflict of interest was to acknowledge 
and address this concern in the initial discussion with potential respondents. By 
exercising integrity and transparency, the researcher very clearly and deliberately 
disclosed the non-financial nature of the study respondent’s participation, to each 
respondent in advance. The researcher clarified, with each respondent that their 
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participation was purely for academic reasons, and as such completely 
disassociated from the researcher’s job. The researcher had the good fortunate of 
securing eleven of the twelve planned interviewees, all of whom are senior ranking 
officials within all three of the targeted sectors. The level of authority of the 
respondent’s contributed towards the mitigation of a perceived power imbalance, as 
all respondent’s viewed the researcher either as a peer or a subordinate. 
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4. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1. A	Presentation	of	the	Themes	Emerging	from	the	Study	
In exploring the research questions for the study, five main themes emerge. Three of 
these themes fall under the main questions, while the remaining two themes fall 
under each of the two sub-questions. The five themes are Consultation, Capacity, 
Accountability, Ownership and the Basis for Development Success or 
Development Discordance.  
These themes have implications for the study’s unit of analysis which is 
engagement on development policy, specifically between public officials situated in 
the Government of Malawi and practitioners situated in donor agencies in Malawi. 
The data illustrates that there are numerous interests, issues and constraints (of both 
a technical and political nature) at play, that exert influence on the nature of 
engagement between the target actors, as they engage on development policy. The 
data also indicates that these numerous influences on the development policy-
making processes appear to have an impact on the outcome of the process. These 
findings are consistent with the literature review which indicates that a state like 
Malawi, which was formed on a set of historically and politically entrenched 
constraints, is likely to experience asymmetrical engagement on national 
development policy, between a range of domestic and international stakeholders. 
5.1.1. Themes	 Emerging	 under	 Question	 1	 (the	 Main	 Research	
Question)	
The main research question aims to understand the ways in which engagement 
emerges, between public officials and locally based donor-agency practitioners, on 
political and technical issues relating to development policy. Under this question, the 
three most prominent themes emerging from the data are Consultation, Capacity 
and Accountability.  
THEME 1: CONSULTATION 
The findings provide evidence that consultation is identified as one of the most 
prominent ways that engagement emerges on development policy in Malawi. This 
concept can be used to understand the actual ways in which engagement emerges. 
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Four distinct sub themes emerge providing further clarity to the question of 
emergence of engagement; these are Selectivity/Exclusion, Institutional 
Arrangements, Government Neutrality, and Prioritisation. 
a. SELECTIVITY/EXCLUSION 
This sub-theme of consultation is exemplified by interviewee CSO Official B, who 
commented that there is “…selective consultation [on development policy] looking at 
the interests that will be affected, especially those in power” (CSO Official B, 
personal communication, February 22, 2014). This comment captures the notion of a 
consultative process that considers select political interests, representing a select 
constituency – which based on Malawi’s electoral system and it’s multiplicity of 
pluralistic public interest is most likely representing the minority – on a subject that 
should otherwise consider a broader base of interests. This suggests that 
consultations may not be as inclusive as possible. Interviewee Govt Official A 
comments further that the “winner takes all approach to development planning, 
[which means that]… opposition voices are excluded from the development planning 
process, as well as [that there are]… very few avenues for dialogue on development 
outside of government” (Govt Official A, personal communication, February 7, 2014). 
One of the few avenues for engagement on development policy in Malawi is the 
CABS’s (Common Approach to Budget Support) grouping, which is an exclusive 
platform dominated by senior level officials from the government and donor 
agencies. Representatives from civil society are invited but rarely attend and if they 
do attend, indications are that there is limited opportunity for them to influence 
decision-making on development policy through this platform. Interviewee CSO 
Official B (personal communication, February 22, 2014) indicates that consultation 
takes place after government and donors have already made a decision. Interviewee 
Donor A’s comments support interviewee CSO B comments, by pointing out that  
“There are limitations to who is involved [in engagement on development 
policy], and it does not go far beyond public officials and donors, most of the 
consultations are organised under the Sector Working Groups, as such there 
are mixed levels of success depending on the sector. The Democratic 
Governance sector is particularly difficult because…it is an odd mixture of 
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issues [and] it is hard to conceive of a democratic sector, in… [a]sector wide 
approach, so I am not sure that it [the Democratic Governance Sector] was an 
entirely positive outcome…” (Donor A, personal communication, February 5, 
2014) 
Finally, Donor D commented that “Over the three administrations I have been in 
development work [I] have seen that the shape and form of public 
engagement…have differed according to who is in state house, and also by 
ministry…When consultation has been conditional …it has been put to use” (Donor 
D, personal communication, February 20, 2014). This comment suggests that 
consultation, for the purposes of informing development policy, is not domestically 
institutionalised. This also suggests that consultation is not motivated by a 
commitment to optimising development outcomes, rather that consultation is 
conducted as a prerequisite to aid, consequently neglecting the substantive value of 
consultation to development policy. 
b. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The sub-theme on institutional arrangements for consultations suggests that there 
are deficiencies in the consultative institutional arrangements for development policy 
in Malawi.  
Interviewee CSO Official A explains that there is a problem with the actual selection 
of representatives who serve as proxies to citizens in consultations on development 
policy. Traditional Authorities tend to be selected as the default representative of 
citizens’ interest with weak representation from civil society organisations that have 
questionable ties to their identified constituencies. Given this scenario the 
interviewee feels that “the capacity of the moderator is critical in ensuring 
representation…so that the chief can understand and represent the issues 
[adequately and ensure]…effectiveness of the representatives for the diverse groups 
[in consultations on development policy].” (CSO Official A, personal communication, 
February 17, 2014) 
Interviewee CSO Official B recommended that there is need for flexibility in the rules 
that govern platforms for dialogue, “to accommodate the interface between the 
modern society and the traditional society” (CSO Official B, personal communication, 
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February 22, 2014). This finding corresponded with the finding that suggested that 
development policy consultation is dominated by traditional authorities. CSO Official 
B also indicated that consultative institutions have adopted a rational institutional 
model which has not been customised to suit the needs of Malawian society“. The 
rationale of the institution must fit into the traditional structure …the dominance of 
traditional culture is a hindrance to rational institutions” (CSO Official B, personal 
communication, February 22, 2014). In this interviewee’s perspective, the issue that 
needs to be addressed is the necessity to understand “…how democratic politics 
[can] match the traditional rationale?” (CSO Official B, personal communication, 
February 22, 2014). This interviewee also identified the source of these institutional 
inadequacies as the deficiencies in the Malawian constitution, which they view as 
having had the singular objective of removing Malawi’s dictator of thirty years. As a 
consequence they propose that the writing up of the constitution missed the 
opportunity to reflect the values of the traditional sphere (CSO Official B, personal 
communication, February 22, 2014). 
The executive arm of government and international development agencies were 
identified as the more dominant institutions influencing development policy in Malawi. 
Interviewee Govt. Official A sees the Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) 
as the only platform for debate on development issues and it only convenes 
substantially twice a year. They stated that “It [CABS’s] is structured such that it 
focuses mainly on economic and financial management, and because of time 
limitations and the absence of other forums it gets overloaded with issues which are 
not paid adequate attention.” (Govt Official A, personal communication, February 7, 
2014) 
Most of the interviewees indicated that particular actors within the executive wield 
disproportionate influence in the formulation of development policy. Interviewee 
Donor D stated that“…depending on whom the institutional players are, the rules 
tend to be different” (Donor D, personal communication, February 20, 2014). For 
instance the Ministry of Finance will take precedence over the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development. The interviewee also indicated that the institutional 
arrangements for consultation are not clearly articulated, “…and this is the reason 
why we get variations between sectors …by administrations… [and] by issue”. 
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(Donor D, personal communication, February 20, 2014). Donor D also expressed 
that they see the policy process in Malawi as being misplaced, in that civil servants 
are responsible for making policies over politicians. This interviewee questions the 
legitimacy of the development policy process, because they believe that civil 
servants have captured the development policy making process and are driving the 
policy process, such that “…party manifesto’s do not seem to be the basis” (Donor 
D, personal communication, February 20, 2014) for the formulation of policy.  
Interviewee Govt. Official B highlights another issue that is affected by this power 
differential in the policy making process, which is the overlaps between the 
development policies and the change of government. In Govt. Official B’s view this 
overlap “poses a problem because changes [in administration] also affect the use of 
the resource envelop, our [civil servants’] job is to advise and their [politicians’] job is 
to make decisions, and those decisions will have to be within the framework.” (Govt. 
Official B, personal communication, February 25, 2014). This interviewee also 
questioned the ability of these revolving politicians to remain within the 
developmental framework. 
Interviewee Donor C focused in on the lack of synergy between the key platforms for 
consultation. One of these synergies being the ability for institutions like CABS to 
inform upstream decision making on development policy in institutions like 
parliament. Donor C highlighted that development 
“…policies do not go to parliament for legitimisation, therefore there are no 
mitigating factors [against emphasis of narrow special interests], within the 
public services. If our policies were passed through parliament before the 
bureaucratic systems starts implementing programs… [then they would have 
been mitigation against undue civil servant biases]. Parliament would be the 
best [institution] to look at the interests and come up with the best way 
forward. (Donor C, personal communication, February 17, 2014) 
In mitigating the consultation shortcomings Donor A highlights that “some donors 
have incorporated an additional layers of stakeholder consultations between the 
Malawi development policy MGDS and the formulation of their country strategies.” 
(Donor A, personal communication, February 5, 2014) 
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c. GOVERNMENT NEUTRALITY 
Interviewees indicated that successive governments since the advent of multiparty 
democratic politics in Malawi have struggled to facilitate consultations in which the 
results of the consultations are not rigged in favour of the interests of the ruling party, 
who also tend to be in the minority. Interviewee CSO Official A stated that “the over 
politicisation of the development process has turned the state into a tool for 
marginalisation, where the incumbent does not lose to the detriment of critical 
reflection on actual development needs” (CSO Official A, personal communication, 
February 17, 2014). Govt. Official A also added that the  
“Civil service is supposed to be professional and objectivity…but in the 
contexts of Malawi it is very difficult to incorporate diverse interests. Politically 
sensitive projects or highly visible interventions limit the civil servants role, a 
good example is the Fertilizer Input Subsidy Program (FISP) were 
recommendations for policy amendments are not welcome, due to its 
importance for the electorate.”(Govt Official A, personal communication, 
February 7, 2014) 
Interviewee Donor A provided an example of political influence compromising 
development outcomes, by stating that”…something that has really come out with 
the cash-gate [the 2013 financial scandal] is the politicisation of appointments, so 
then if someone is beholden to the president for having that position, they are not 
going to want to take a contrary position to what the president wants” (Donor A, 
personal communication, February 5, 2014). 
Interviewee Donor C elucidates further by providing the recommendation that “there 
is need for a paradigm shift in the way policies are brought into the public…because 
the bureaucratic system is not ‘neutral competent’ [what is needed] is to make 
institutions strong… [to] insulate the processes and procedures from political 
interference” (Donor C, personal communication, February 17, 2014) 
d. PRIORITISATION 
Some of the interviewees indicated that consultations on development policy do not 
consider the prioritisation of the pluralistic public interests in accordance with the 
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reality of limited resources. They indicate that prioritisation is not governed by clearly 
articulated principles that reflect the democratic context within which these 
consultations on development policy occur. Interviewee CSO Official A highlighted 
that“…the country dances to the tune of those who provide the nickel and the pound” 
(CSO Official A, personal communication, February 17, 2014) in reference to 
governments prioritisation of donor demands in a bid to secure development aid. 
CSO Official A also indicated that government shows an “…allegiance to the donor 
partners and not the people, they [government] become insensitive to the needs of 
the people” (CSO Official A, personal communication, February 17, 2014). The 
interviewee provided an illustration of how donor needs are promoted over locally 
generated priorities by highlighting that basic “…existential concerns [food, shelter 
etc.] which are based on an anthropology understanding of Malawian society, must 
be met first, before issues of human rights and diversity can be addressed” (CSO 
Official A, personal communication, February 17, 2014). This point captures several 
respondents’ observations that donors have tended to rank the human rights agenda 
as a higher priority than the need to meet basic existential needs. As such, 
development policy is seen as over emphasising human rights to satisfy donor 
interests.  
Interviewee Govt. Official A indicated that government spending is an illustration of 
the challenge of prioritisation, stating that “so much money is spent on maintaining 
the [bureaucratic] system leaving very little to delivery”(Govt Official A, personal 
communication, February 7, 2014). The interviewee also recommended that “the 
ministry’s of Finance and Economic Planning and Development, need to band 
together to ask the tough budgeting questions that will enable the bureaucracy to 
better service the people’s development needs, [because] ….the handouts culture is 
a major problem” (Govt Official A, personal communication, February 7, 2014). 
Finally Donor A expressed concern that in development policy consultations “service 
sector issues are prioritised over Governance and Democracy” (Donor A, personal 
communication, February 5, 2014). 
THEME2: CAPACITY 
Some of the interviewees indicated that Capacity to engage on development policy 
is a challenge to the way that engagement emerges on development policy, between 
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public officials and donor agency practitioners. Two sub-themes to capacity emerge 
under this theme namely, Analytical and Reflective Capacity and the capacity for 
Managing Tradeoffs. The interviewees indicated that engagement on development 
policy at the national level, while also drawing on global instruments, is hampered by 
the limited capacity of both the public officials and donor agency practitioners.  
a. ANALYTICAL AND REFLECTIVE CAPACITY 
Interviewee CSO Official A stated that “an anthropological understanding of the way 
our [Malawian] society is structured is the missing link and critical consideration for 
policy formulation” (CSO Official A, personal communication, February 17, 2014). 
Whereas CSO Official B shared an observation from prior involvement in 
international trade negotiations representing Malawi, that “…on the international 
platform technical experts from the African Union do not possess the range of 
expertise, like the European Union, as such relations are based on unevenness 
capacities in their levels of preparedness and capability to engage and negotiate” 
(CSO Official B, personal communication, February 22, 2014). 
Govt. Official B raised the concern that locally “the donors are more dominant but 
lack institutional memory” (Govt. Official B, personal communication, February 25, 
2014), as a result of their routine staff rotation policies. The interviewee indicated 
that donor agency staff do not stay in country long enough to adequately engage 
with the development issues, so as to effectively contribute to development policy 
processes. Whereas Donor A stated, that “across all the sectors …everyone is 
understaffed… [and in some instances] it is that their roles are not clear” (Donor A, 
personal communication, February 5, 2014). 
Donor C provided a concrete example where analysis failed to influence the decision 
on a flagship education policy because of political interference.  
“We have seen politicians championing policy without considering the 
knowledge base that public officials possess, [for example] free primary 
education were the bureaucratic system was never consulted and this policy 
was championed by politicians because it was put in their manifesto after the 
1990 Jomtien Declaration …and implemented wholesale. If it had gone 
through the bureaucratic system they would have [conducted] policy analysis 
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[and drawn lessons from the implementation of earlier policies].” (Donor C, 
personal communication, February 17, 2014) 
b. MANAGING TRADEOFFS 
The findings indicate that there is lack of capacity to manage developmental 
tradeoffs when engaging on development policy. Interviewee Govt. Official B 
explained how civil servants should help governments to make decisions on 
tradeoffs noting however that this has not necessarily been the practice.  
“The civil servants role in managing tradeoffs includes highlighting the 
[electoral] implications of deviations from development policy. This includes 
advice on how changes can affect the economy, and how in turn this also 
affects the voting decisions of the electorate. (Govt. Official B, personal 
communication, February 25, 2014) 
Interviewee Donor D identified a gap in the various levels of local and international 
perceptions of the development problem. The interviewee said that at the local level  
“sometimes [technocrats] have different views on what the issues are, and the 
villagers have a different expectation, they have a narrower perspective. You 
[the technocrat] are looking at data from Chitipa to Nsanje [across Malawi] 
while they are only looking at data up to the next village. They know their 
neighbours problems and their own, so they look at it in terms of solving 
current problems …the experienced issues.” (Donor D, personal 
communication, February 20, 2014) 
While the interviewee also observed that at the sub-national, national and 
international levels the “…domestication and contextualisation of international 
instruments and global partnership commitments, which set developmental 
yardsticks, has been a challenge that has not yet been adequately addressed.” 
(Donor D, personal communication, February 20, 2014) 
THEME 3: ACCOUNTABILITY 
Some of the interviews identified accountability as both an enabler and impediment 
to engagement on development policy. Four sub-themes can be identified under this 
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theme namely; Political Accountability, Bureaucratic Accountability, 
Democratic Deficit and Mutual Accountability. 
a. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
One of the interviewees shared their perspective on governmental efforts to enhance 
political accountability through the government structure. The interviewee shared 
that  
“People need to be empowered to demand from their decision makers …The 
Office of the President and Cabinet is assisting the ‘client’ by developing public 
service charters, removing  the bureaucratic layers and [addressing] corruption 
by setting expectations, empowering communities …[and] ensuring that 
government is efficient and accountable”(Govt. Official D, personal 
communication, February 21, 2014). 
While another interviewee illustrated some of the challenges for political 
accountability, that have a bearing on engagement on development policy. Donor D 
illustrated this point by saying that,  
“It is very difficult to hold political leaders to account because of Malawi’s multiple 
planning frameworks, which are difficult to reconcile. As such, this has negatively 
affected the realisation of political accountability, making it difficult to…hold a unit 
[of government to account] and to isolate it, and be able to map [its area of 
responsibility] and [identify] the interventions meant for a particular village [for 
instance]” (Donor D, personal communication, February 20, 2014). 
b. Bureaucratic Accountability  
Several of the interviewees indicated that the erosion of bureaucratic accountability 
is an impediment to the emergence of engagement on development policy. 
CSO Official A said that a reduction in meritocratic appointments in favour of 
loyalists, has resulted in misplaced human resources which is unable to “…serve as 
an independent civil service” (CSO Official A, personal communication, February 17, 
2014).Govt. Official A went further by providing the following prognosis, 
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“The appointment of senior offices in government is a problem. During the first 
government there was a divorce between politics and mainstream public 
service, but since we became a democracy there has been more of a 
connection between the civil servants and the ruling government, and this has 
taken away from the independence of the civil service.” (Govt Official A, 
personal communication, February 7, 2014) 
To further illustrate the point, Donor D provided the following statement: “The civil 
service needs to make clear at which point policies change, for example civil service 
work place policies that facilitate their interface with the public, change at a whim, 
when they are requested to account to the public for certain actions” (Donor D, 
personal communication, February 20, 2014). 
c. Democratic Deficit 
Some of the interviewees mentioned that the shortfalls in Malawi’s democratic 
realities serve as an impediment to engagement on development policy. This 
position was best articulated by CSO Official B who said that;  
“I don’t agree with the idea [that], in Malawi people should be doing [what is 
right] because donors said we should do [what is right], but they should be 
doing [what is right] because something has gone wrong. On ‘cashgate’, as a 
public we were not supposed to react because donors are withdrawing 
funds… but because something wrong has happened, the public anger and 
reactions …should be based on the values which we have embedded in the 
constitution.”(CSO Official B, personal communication, February 22, 2014) 
To further illustrate the shortfalls in the countries democratic processes Govt. Official 
D pointed out that, “…the [‘cashgate’ forensic] report was sent to the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] before it was sent to the citizens, and … most of the 
money is from government… so it’s the citizens [money].”(Govt. Official D, personal 
communication, February 21, 2014). The interviewee also added that “The donors 
are calling the shots [demanding] that they want the report to come from the 
consultants and not from government” (Govt. Official D, personal communication, 
February 21, 2014), suggesting that donors may have undue influence on the 
processes of democratic accountability, over and above the citizens of the country. 
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To add to this Donor D also illustrated how the government appears to have a 
stronger sense of accountability to the donor community, than it has to the citizens of 
Malawi. For example with “state party reporting on human rights …you have got 
governments who are failing to reproduce human rights reports in their own 
countries, willing to submit reports somewhere in New York. They are accountable to 
New York, [but] they are not accountable at the local level.” (Govt. Official D, 
personal communication, February 21, 2014). 
d. Mutual Accountability  
Govt. Official A questioned whether development policy priorities are arrived at 
mutually and indicated that, 
“bilaterals’ [donor agencies] are limited by foreign policy dictates, which may 
not always correspond with the development needs; multilaterals’ are limited 
by their development interest, for example the World Bank and Open 
Government. The our way or the highway approach introduces challenges for 
development policy” 
Donor D on the other hand highlighted how the international principle of mutual 
accountability is very dependent on the comprehension and will of the political 
leadership. They said that mutual accountability “depends on the political leadership 
…the Bingu administration tried to take the Paris Declaration by its word, but now 
that he is out of the picture you do not hear any mention of it, so it means there is a 
connection between political leadership and which international instruments are 
being brought into the domestic arena.”(Donor D, personal communication, February 
20, 2014). 
5.2.1. Themes	Emerging	under	Question	2	(the	1st	Sub‐Research	
Question)	
The second question, which is the first sub-question of the main research question, 
aims to understand the role that evolving global partnership commitments play in 
engagement on development policy in Malawi, between public officials and locally 
based practitioners in donor agencies.  
THEME 4: OWNERSHIP 
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The findings indicated that several of the interviews were questioning whether global 
partnership commitments do indeed have a legitimate role in domestic engagement 
on development policy, particularly the principle of national ownership. The four sub-
themes emerging under this theme are Competing Agendas’, Leadership Deficit, 
Conditionality and Effective Partnership Precursors. 
a. COMPETING AGENDAS 
Some of the interviewees identified a potential conflict between the ownership and 
democracy agendas, which crowds out adherence to global commitments in 
domestic engagement on development policy. Govt. Official A made this point by 
stating that “there is a limit to which ownership can be [achieved] in a democratic 
state. Whose ideas do you take? Unfortunately some of the ideas… have 
undermined ownership, so you may think it is the consensus on the development 
course but it is just narrow interests” (Govt Official A, personal communication, 
February 7, 2014). The interviewee also emphasised that an important ingredient for 
the local ownership principle to be realised, in the context of a fledgling democracy, 
is visionary leadership. 
While Donor C identified a conflict between government interests and donor 
interests, which question the legitimacy of a local ownership principle in the 
development policy process. The interviewee said that, 
“there are two forces [in the formulation of development policy], Government 
wanting to include all the stakeholders in the policy formulation process whether it 
is cosmetic or grounded in research that was done by policy analysts, or not. On 
the other side are reforms, which are being driven by the development partners, 
where government just seems to be following what development partners want 
…without involving all the stakeholders including civil society” (Donor C, personal 
communication, February 17, 2014). 
b. LEADERSHIP DEFICIT 
Some of the interviewees indicated that shortfalls in leadership impact the role that 
global partnership commitments play in domestic engagement on development 
policy. Donor D raised the following issues towards this point, questioning whether 
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the development policy process is led by the political leadership or rather that it is led 
by the bureaucratic leadership: 
“Who should have been the one issuing the policy, [should it not have been] 
the party manifestos which are supposed to inform the political policies of a 
particular administration? But they [development policies] don’t seem to be 
the basis of that. There is a clash there… [should we not start with] the 
political position and then civil servants find their place in that policy, or 
[should we] start with the civil servants coming up with the policy and then 
giving them to politicians to [simply] endorse” (Donor D, personal 
communication, February 20, 2014). 
Whereas, Govt Official A said that “leadership with a ‘can do’ attitude is lacking as, 
well as the ability to make decisive decisions and take bold steps” (Govt Official A, 
personal communication, February 7, 2014) and this has consequences for the 
leaderships ability to effectively draw on global partnership commitments when 
necessary. 
c. CONDITIONALITY 
Several interviewees indicated that conditionality can serve as a challenge to the 
domestic realisation of global partnership commitments, in specific reference to the 
development policy process. For instance CSO Official B said that “as a poor country 
people have mortgaged their interests to the donors…, donor conditions go into 
institutional decision making. [For example they can request that]…we want so and 
so to be removed in order for you to be funded, instead of placing conditions on 
broader institutional strengthening” (CSO Official B, personal communication, 
February 22, 2014). 
In an attempt to highlight the underlying challenges with conditionality, Govt. Official 
D offered the following analysis. 
“Conditions detract from delivery, and we need to move towards mutual trust 
on both sides, because trust is in the way of mutual understanding. I’m not 
saying that it is only on the side of donors, even on the side of government 
there are so many layers [of] bureaucracy. If we can beat this and lessen the 
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conditions … [have] one common understanding [and] trust, then that will be a 
beautiful day… At the moment cashgate has overshadowed the entire 
relationship between donors and government, potentially overlooking a large 
number of reform-minded individuals, who want to make a difference.”(Govt. 
Official D, personal communication, February 21, 2014). 
Donor D provided a tangible example, where conditionality led to the reprioritisation 
of national development priorities in response to donor demands, which did not 
necessarily reflect the domestic application of global partnership commitments. 
“During the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) process, HIV/AIDS was 
ranked 17thby Malawians in the issues paper, but since IMF and World Bank had 
already decided that part of the money would be spent on HIV/AIDS… it was 
brought as a condition and raised to number three. …For villagers it was not a 
problem worth [prioritising], while for international actors that was the [priority]. [It 
might have been] a question of [representing the issue differently] as health 
problems and not necessarily HIV/AIDS … but as a result HIV/AIDS was one of 
the 12 [priorities] that received funding.” (Donor D, personal communication, 
February 20, 2014). 
d. EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP PRECURSORS 
Two precursors to effective partnerships were emphasised by some of the 
interviewees. One of the precursors is an appropriate democratic process for 
identifying development priorities, and the other is a functional bureaucracy. 
Donor D alluded to the need to strengthen Malawi’s representative democratic 
processes when the interviewee said that, there is… 
“…a disjoint between what the politicians consider to be the agenda for 
Malawi, and what Malawians themselves consider to be the agenda for 
Malawi. That discourse unfortunately doesn’t always get encouraged by 
politicians; because it is a challenge to their monopoly over [determining] what 
should be the priority …They forget that in a democracy you have the majority 
rule [that] doesn’t hate the minority. [Malawi needs]…an effective 
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parliament… [so that] these other [minority] interests can be taken 
onboard.”(Donor D, personal communication, February 20, 2014) 
Whereas, Govt. Official A emphasised that Malawi needs a functional bureaucracy, 
to facilitate effective partnerships and ownership, to“…be able to articulate policies 
and negotiate, so [that] there is a connection between global partnerships, civil 
service and the donors, [to facilitate] coherence, not forgetting what the people are, 
[and] their value.”(Govt Official A, personal communication, February 7, 2014). 
While most of the interviewees identified a link between a functional bureaucracy 
and effective partnerships, Donor A highlighted some ways that public officials could 
leverage donor support to enable effective partnerships. 
“…so long as the government of Malawi is open to having foreign experts 
come in and help them identify the problems and strengthen the problem 
[areas], and then get the proper training for Malawian officials… [as well as] 
see if the civil service could be downsized, and salaries could be brought up 
to a living level. That has really been highlighted as one of the systemic 
problems feeding the tendency for corruption … [then the bureaucracy could 
break the] vicious cycle and turn it into a virtuous cycle.”(Donor A, personal 
communication, February 5, 2014) 
5.2.2. Themes	Emerging	under	Question	3	(the	2nd	Sub‐Research	
Question)	
The third and final question, which is the second sub-question of the main research 
question, aims to understand the effects of engagement between public officials and 
locally based donor-agency practitioners, on development policy in Malawi. 
THEME 5: BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS OR DEVELOPMENT 
DISCORDANCE 
Several of the interviewees identified numerous ways in which engagement on 
development policy in Malawi can either contribute to laying the foundation for 
development success, or frustrate efforts towards the attainment of development 
success. Elements contributing to development success or discordance were 
identified within both the public officials and locally based donor-agency 
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practitioners. These elements were either self-identified by members from within a 
particular target cluster population i.e. the public officials, or by members from 
another target cluster population i.e. the donor practitioners identifying success and 
discordance elements in public officials and vice versa. There are two sub themes 
under this theme Intervention Logic and Leveraging Partnerships. 
a. INTERVENTION LOGIC 
Several of the interviewees said that some of the challenges to engagement on 
development policy, between public officials and locally based donor-agency 
practitioners, can be traced in the underlying intervention logic. 
CSO Official A indicated that engagement on development policy between public 
officials and donor agency practitioners can result in confusing development theories 
and practices. For example “…in social protection, first [the locally based donor 
practitioners] advocated for social transfers, then shortly afterwards food relief [then 
back again resulting in] constant changes… [that create] antagonistic forces as 
opposed to cooperating forces” (CSO Official A, personal communication, February 
17, 2014). While CSO Official B reflected on the adoption and adaption aspects of 
engagement between public officials and donors, and said that “the countries policy 
orientation is not compatible with the development process. It contains policy 
frameworks borrowed from the donors, not considering the local context to mitigate 
the borrowed development pathways” (CSO Official B, personal communication, 
February 22, 2014). 
Lastly Donor D reflected on some of the challenges in relation to development 
planning, programming and strategy, which have the potential to undermine the 
outcomes of engagement on development policy, and whose remedy is within the 
control of public officials, particularly civil servants. The interviewee said that in 
Malawi there are  
“…various planning frameworks, OPC (Office of the President and Cabinet) has 
got its administrative districts, Agriculture has got its extension planning areas, 
NSO (National Statistics Office) has got statistical sampling areas, the same OPC 
has got[electoral] wards and constituencies, Health uses Traditional Authorities, 
Education uses different [planning] units altogether. You cannot automatically 
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take a plan from health and superimpose it on education, and [be certain] that 
you are dealing with one same issue for the same village. The civil services by 
now should have harmonised these [planning frameworks], ensuring that policies 
can speak to each other, that is the role that civil servants has not been able to 
[fulfil].” (Donor D, personal communication, February 20, 2014). 
b. LEVERAGING PARTNERSHIPS 
Some of the interviewees identified instances where, while engaging on 
development policy, development partners have been able to leverage their 
partnerships domestically, towards either a positive development outcome or an 
outcome that potentially undermines the legitimacy of the development partnership. 
Govt. Official A indicated that local level engagement assists in finding joint solutions 
to situations that would receive stricter measures internationally. For example 
“…some of the measures taken following the 2013 ‘cashgate’ scandal, which led to 
the withdrawal of direct budget support, included the redirection of aid within country 
as opposed to a complete deduction of aid to the country” (Govt Official A, personal 
communication, February 7, 2014). This is an example of a positive outcome from 
domestic engagement on development policy. The interviewee also highlighted a 
challenge within the public official cluster population, which can delay realising the 
value of engagement on development policy. The interviewee said that, “there is a 
time lag in the effect of engagement on development policy, [which is] due to the 
impression that the adoption of ideas, for example [the concern that accepting the 
need for]civil society, will be understood as admission of failure on the part of 
government” (Govt Official A, personal communication, February 7, 2014). As 
opposed to perceiving this as a potentially constructive contribution, from the donor 
practitioners cluster population, towards the enhancement of the country’s 
development policy. 
Govt. Official D highlighted an imbalance in the relationship between public officials 
and donor agency practitioners, emanating from the dynamics surrounding aid 
dependency. The interviewee said that,  
“…one key challenge is that forty percent of the resources [funding 
development policy] are from the donors, so when it comes to negotiation you 
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may negotiate to a certain extent, because the cooperating partners also have 
a bigger voice which is forty percent of the portfolio, and that makes it difficult 
for Malawi to champion its own development programs …we need to deal with 
this [problem of aid dependency] and reduce it as we go on” (Govt. Official D, 
personal communication, February 21, 2014), 
In offering a solution to the challenge of aid dependence in the interim, Govt. Official 
D suggested that the public official cluster population needs to leverage development 
assistance through the Malawi Development Assistance Strategy, so that the 
“ownership comes out permanently” (Govt. Official D, personal communication, 
February 21, 2014). 
Finally, Donor D highlighted some of the benefits to cooperation through 
engagement on development policy, between public officials and donor agency 
practitioners, by saying that donors have some form of  
“…immunity from the local dynamics, and can speak on certain issues without 
bearing the consequences [that local public officials face]. Of course the medium 
matters, they can’t say the same things on radio and in the media that they can 
say in a meeting. They also have the ability to advance their cause because they 
are financially empowered …they can put money on the table for that cause, 
which is not easy for the civil service to do …They have been able to call upon 
expertise that do not exist in Malawi to provide backroom support for analytical 
work, that supports policy formulation …However, context matters and the local 
realities need to take precedence. There is no use for them [donors] to push 
headquarters policies if they will not work [in the local context]” (Donor D, 
personal communication, February 20, 2014) 
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Table 2: A Schematic Presentation of the Findings 
 
 
 
 MAIN QUESTION 
How does engagement emerge 
on development policy between 
public officials and locally 
based donor agency 
practitioners? 
SUB-QUESTION 1 
What role do the evolving 
global partnership 
commitments (GPC’s) play in 
this engagement? 
SUB- QUESTION 2 
What are the effects of this 
engagement on development 
policy in Malawi? 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
EMERGING THEMES
EMERGING SUB‐THEMES
Engagement on development policy 
emerges through CONSULTATION 
There are CAPACITY constraints for 
engagement on development policy 
Engagement on development policy 
faces ACCOUNTABILITY concerns
The national OWNERSHIP principle 
raises question about the role of 
GPC’s in engagement on 
development policy 
Engagement has the potential to form 
the BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT 
SUCCESS OR DEVELOPMENT 
DISCORDANCE 
That is SELECTIVE with regards to exclusion of interests 
and participation 
It requires particular INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
It encounters challenges of GOVERNMENT NEUTRALITY 
It encounters challenges with PRIORITISATION
There is limited ANALYTICAL AND REFLECTIVE CAPACITY to 
engage on development policy
There is limited capacity for MANAGING TRADEOFFS 
There is limited POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
There is limited BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Concerns are amplified by a DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
It is exercised with limited MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
COMPETING AGENDAS challenge the ownership principle 
ALEADERSHIP DEFICIT undermines the role of GPC’s 
Some forms of CONDITIONALITY undermine the role of GPC’s 
There are some existing and potential examples of EFFECTIVE 
PARTNERSHIP PRECURSORS in Malawi
The underlying INTERVENTION LOGIC is contributing to 
development policy success or discordance 
Engagement is helping and can help further to LEVERAGE
PARTNERSHIPS for development policy
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5. UNDERSTANDING THE FINDINGS 
The main research question seeks to understand the ways in which engagement 
emerges, on political and technical issues relating to development policy, between 
public officials and locally based donor-agency practitioners, 
The Malawian constitution recognises democratic pluralism (Malawi Constitution, 
chapters, I, III, & IV). In principle this recognises the existence of pluralistic public 
interests, including those in relation to national development policy. While all of the 
interviewees identified consultation as the most prominent way that engagement 
emerges on development policy. They also indicated that there are challenges with 
this consultation, as it tends to happen among select groups, as such is not 
representative of a wider constituency of interests. The interviewees indicated that 
consultations on development policy are conducted selectively, particularly with 
regards to the inclusion of interests and participants. This suggests that 
consultations on development policy in Malawi do not adequately provide for a 
plurality of interests. 
The literature review established that the Paris Declaration (PD) sets consultation on 
development policy, as a measure of optimal steps towards the achievement of aid 
effectiveness. The literature suggests that consultation on development policy has 
the potential to set a developing country on the pathway to development success. 
Furthermore, that the PD supports the logic that national development policy, which 
is derived through a broad consultative process, is a best practice and global 
governance standard for developing countries. According to the PD this signals that 
the developing country/aid recipient is demonstrating the principle of national 
ownership. If these yardsticks are to be used as a simple measure of Malawi’s 
progress towards formulating development policy, that has an increased chance of 
aid and/or development effectiveness, then it can be deduced that the wide 
recognition of consultation on development policy is a positive signal of progress 
towards development success. 
However, Faust (2010) offers an alternative perspective which dismantles this simple 
logic, by highlighting that the PD expects consultation to be on policy content which, 
he argues, is not a realistic expectation for a fledgling democracy where the policy 
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content is in constant flux. The earlier findings that consultations on development 
policy in Malawi are exclusionary: they encounter challenges with government’s 
facilitative neutrality, tilted in favour of narrow interests; they enable undue influence 
in the setting of developmental priorities; shows that policy content in Malawi is 
arrived at through a range of volatile influences.  
The findings also demonstrate a deficit in political and bureaucratic accountability 
between the citizenry and the state, as well as a deficit in mutual accountability 
between the state and the donor community on matters relating to development 
policy. The interviewees’ responses indicate that the characteristics of consultation 
and identified accountability deficits stems from a struggle, in the political and 
administrative organs of the state, to transition from autocratic politics to multi-party 
democratic politics. This reading in the findings resonates with Blessings Chinsinga’s 
(2010) observations that party loyalty in Malawi takes precedence over bureaucratic 
professionalism and neutral competence, despite the adoption of democratic politics. 
This suggests that there is incongruence between the legislated democratic 
ideals underpinning politics in Malawi and the actual political practices, which 
may not be suitable for the delivery of development policy dividends to the 
wider Malawian citizenry. 
These challenges characterise Malawi’s young democracy, and the situation is 
compounded by the country’s status as progressively aid dependent (Hailu & 
Shiferaw, 2012). These findings also suggests that consultations on development 
policy in Malawi do not adequately respond to volatile fluctuations in policy 
content, which are driven by the experience of transitioning to democracy, and 
is further compounded by the country’s lack of economic independence. This 
supports the arguments posited by Faust’s (2010) and Booth (2011). Faust’s (2010) 
arguments that it is difficult for development actors to reach sustained consensus on 
development policy content in a fledgling democracy, and this study’s findings offers 
insights into the difficulties. While Booth’s (2011) arguments that aid dependency 
introduces additional complexities to consensus on policy content in a fledgling 
democracy and again this study’s findings offers insights into the complexities. 
There are two significant findings that resonate with the concerns of inequality, 
power imbalance, and trust in development cooperation, raised in the problem 
Page 66 of 100 
 
statement above. The findings indicate that both the domestic politics of winner-
takes-all, and the microcosmic global politics of aid-based-power-differential, which 
exists between public officials and donor agency practitioners, are evident in the 
formulation of development policy in Malawi. It is also evident that these two 
elements have a disproportionate influence on development policy content, over and 
above other development actors’ i.e. civil society, individual citizens etc. As such, 
development policy formulation in Malawi is not based on an all-
encompassing national agenda. There are indications of undue influence of 
select domestic political interests and foreign aid provider interests, in the 
engagement on development policy and as such the resultant policy. These 
findings and the interpretation of these findings respond to the second and third 
research questions, which seek respectively, to understand whether there is indeed 
a role that global partnership agreements play in engagement on development 
policy, as well as what the effects of engagement are on development policy 
between our two focus populations. 
Some of the interviewees indicated that donor development priorities, which are 
attached to funding conditionalities, are prioritised over domestically identified 
priorities irrespective of their relevance to national priorities. Examples include the 
escalating of HIV/AIDS in the PRSP process in the early 2000’s. The findings 
indicate that un-scrutinised donor conditionalities undermine the consultation 
process. The findings support the claim that this tendency is connected to the 
country’s level of aid dependence and lack of economic independence. This finding 
confirms the challenges highlighted in the study’s problem statement, of unequally 
partnerships emanating from an aid inspired power differential, which is further 
supported by Chinsinga’s (2010) observations that donors have not challenged the 
deterioration of the public policy process post-multiparty politics. The findings also 
demonstrate that in Malawi’s aid dependent context, locally based donors are 
significant development actors in the formulation of development policy, in a 
way that may not respect national priorities and in contradiction with the Paris 
Declaration principles. 
An analysis of the findings indicates that the model of democracy present in 
Malawi, includes traces of both the representative and deliberative models of 
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democracy, as such can be classified as a hybrid model of democracy 
(Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). For instance there is evidence of delegation 
of power away from the citizens much like in a representative democracy identified 
by most of the respondents, as well as evidence of delegation of power to the 
citizens particularly when it is placed as a condition for foreign aid. There is also 
evidence of a redirection of accountability away from citizens towards external actors 
like donors. The predominantly representative or deliberative nature of Malawi’s 
democracy is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Nevertheless, as established 
above, the democratic practices evidenced in the findings are suggestive of a hybrid 
democracy that draws on the features of both of the overarching schools of thought 
on democracy as described by Isakhan & Gagnon, 2010. The literature review 
highlights a study of democracy models and civic engagement, which concludes that 
hybrid models have a reduced probability of individual level civic engagement 
(Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). The recurrent theme of 
selective/exclusionary engagement on development policy can be used as a 
proxy for individual level civic engagement, in which case it can be can argued 
that this finding supports the converse relationship between hybrid models 
and individual level civic engagement. 
Some of the respondents highlighted that donor agency-based practitioners lack 
enduring institutional memory to engage on development policy. This finding is most 
relevant to the second research question on the role of global partnership 
agreements in engagement on development policy. Most of the respondents, 
whether public officials, donor agency practitioners or civil society representatives, 
had a very basic understand of the Paris Declaration, (as the main global partnership 
commitment under study). Such that, despite several probes, the respondents were 
unable to engage on discussions relating to the contextually relevant sections of the 
PD, and they did not appear to be aware of or to understand the globally set 
measures for engagement in a context of fragility. All of the respondents engaged 
with the symptoms of, and outcome based definition of, fragility in the Malawi 
context. Most especially the donor - government fall-out as a consequence of the 
cash-gate financial scandal, which can be understood as a significant example of 
ineffective use of development assistance (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012). However, the 
interviewees were not able to relate the symptoms of fragility to any of the 
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global commitments and instruments for engaging, particularly in a fragile 
context. This suggests that, in practice, global partnership instruments are not 
being utilised or leveraged appropriately. This could be attributed in part, to the 
issues raised about institutional memory and capacities within locally based donor 
agencies, and the untapped value that their international perspective can bring, as 
well as the donor community’s adherence to their commitment to provide 
contextually driven technical cooperation as agreed in the PD (OECD, 2005 & 2008). 
A distinctly separate but related challenge stems from the gaps in the PD. Malawi is 
included in the World Bank (2015) list of fragile countries, but the PD does not 
provide relevant guidance on how to trigger engagement using the principles 
for engagement in a fragile state or situation, which undermines the utility of the 
principles by locally based officials and practitioners.  
Govt. Official A highlighted a clear example where engagement on development 
policy, in the midst of the cash-gate scandal, led to a positive development policy 
outcome. The outcome was the redirection of aid to civil society away from 
government systems, as opposed to a total deduction of aid to the country. This is 
important since Malawi has not yet established a clear strategy for graduating from a 
dependency on aid (Hailu, & Shiferaw, 2012). This example can be analysed using 
the second principle of engagement in a fragile environment, the ‘do no harm’ 
principle (OECD, 2010). In the respondent’s opinion, local level engagement was 
the reason for this favourable outcome for national development policy, 
because the locally based foreign aid workers were best place to understand 
the local needs and arrive at a solution that exercised leniency and that did not 
do any immediate harm. 
In conclusion, the findings show that local level engagement on development policy 
in Malawi, emerges in a context fraught with challenges to the following,  
i) the democratic model and development policy processes in practice;  
ii) the capacity constraints of both domestic and international stakeholders, 
represented by public officials and donor-agency practitioners in this study; 
as well as  
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iii) a disproportionate power imbalance, between citizens and government on 
one hand and government and foreign aid workers on the other, with 
overall ramification on democratic accountability.  
These findings confirm the issues of concern identified in the study’s problem 
statement.  
The findings show that while the Paris Declaration does have some inherent design 
flaws, the useful aspects of the instrument are not being adequately utilised and 
leveraged within the Malawi country context, due to several challenges. These 
include lack of capacity of the public officials, donor agency practitioners and civil 
society representatives, to engage comprehensively with the content of relevant 
global partnership commitments and utilise and leverage these agreements in 
engagement on development policy locally. The other challenge is in the design of 
the Paris Declaration, the findings show how the obscure definition of fragility does 
not provide sufficient and pragmatic guidance on how or under what clear conditions, 
some of aspects of the agreements can be activated. 
Finally, the findings show that engagement on development policy in Malawi has had 
polar effects on development policy. On one hand local engagement on development 
policy, has exhibited a power differential in favour of the donor agency interests in 
the development policy process, which can be associated with aid dependency. 
While on the other hand local engagement on development policy has exhibited a 
few development policy outcomes that are in conformity with the principles of 
engagement on development policy, and more appropriately in a context of fragility.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Cooperation and collaboration are central features in the pursuit of solutions to 
global and national development problems, in today’s complex and interconnected 
world. Over several decades, partnerships between nations have emerged as 
vehicles for development cooperation and collaboration, working through an array of 
cooperation platforms, commitments, agreements, mechanisms, instruments and 
tools.  
This study has endeavoured to explore the ways in which partnerships emerge 
through cooperation on development policy in Malawi. The research questions 
interrogate whether engagement on development policy actually emerges through 
strategic alliances resembling the notion of a ‘partnerships’, as stated by 
international platforms on development cooperation. The questions also explore 
whether, globally recognised commitments for fostering strategic alliances 
understood as partnerships, do indeed have a role in local level engagement on 
development policy. The Paris Declaration is used as a proxy for all global 
commitments endeavouring to foster partnerships in development cooperation, to 
answer the second set of questions. Finally, the research also examines whether 
historical, political and power differentials have an effect on the ways that 
engagement emerges on development policy at a local level. 
There are three most noticeable development challenges emerging from the analysis 
of the findings i) Malawi’s inability to graduate from a state of aid-dependence ii) the 
inability of the development policy process to deliver development dividends, as well 
as usher Malawi out of aid-dependence iiii) a failure in Malawi’s transition to 
democratic politics, in that it has not enabled the establishment of a system of 
governance that is responsive to the objectives of graduating from aid-dependence 
and able to deliver optimised development results for the Malawian citizenry. 
An examination of the ways that engagement emerges on development policy in 
Malawi uncovers that partnerships, as intended in the Paris Declaration, are difficult 
to establish within the local context because of a range of domestic and international 
factors. Partnerships are a means to an end, the end, is to identify and successfully 
implement solutions to shared development problems. Therefore, since the findings 
suggest that partnerships are also contributing as obstacles to the resolution of 
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development problems, then this discovery warrants close attention to realign the 
outcomes of partnerships with the goal of solving development problems.  
The findings from this research have been used to answer the following fundamental 
question– are partnerships a necessary strategy for the achievement of desired 
development results through national development policy? Following the recent 
cashgate financial scandal, it was established that government and the donor 
community were able to arrive at a measured response, to this clear example of 
ineffective use of development resources, through domestic cooperation. This is 
particularly important since it was also established that Malawi is not ready to be 
rapidly withdrawn from foreign aid (Hailu, & Shiferaw, 2012), without risking a total 
collapse of this already fragile state (World Bank, 2015). Using this example, it is 
justifiable to say that partnerships are relevant to development cooperation, 
particularly on ephemeral development policy challenges, in the Malawi context. 
However, it has also been established that some of Malawi’s most prominent 
development challenges are not only ephemeral in nature, but also include enduring 
challenges like aid-dependency and poor longitudinal development results. If our 
definition of cooperation is based on a mutual understanding and agreement on the 
contributions and payoffs (Gulati, et. al., 2012), then it is reasonable to expect that 
the payoffs should include ephemeral and enduring payoffs. It can be concluded 
therefore, that a shortcoming in Malawi’s partnerships for development through 
engagement on development policy is that they are failing to achieve payoffs on 
enduring development challenges. This raises questions about the ability of local 
level engagement on development challenges to effectively address the more 
enduring development challenges. 
The next logical questions is – why does it appear that partnerships are unable to 
yield both ephemeral as well as more enduring development results in Malawi? The 
findings draw the following conclusions. The challenges to resolving development 
problems through development policy, in the Malawi, stem from domestic, 
international and transnational influences. The transnational challenges are those 
that transcend the discernible realm of the domestic and or international. 
Domestically it has been established that consultation, as a primary mode of 
engagement on development policy, has several deficiencies. The foremost 
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deficiencies are exclusionary participation and structural inabilities to cope with 
fluctuations in policy content emanating from the volatilities associated with 
transitioning to democracy. It was also found that domestically public officials have a 
disproportionate influence on development policy, in a way that potentially 
undermines civic engagement. Internationally the study shows that foreign-aid-
workers, whether at an individual or organisational level, also have a 
disproportionate influence on development policy, in a way that potentially 
undermines civic engagement. Trans-nationally, a conflict is found between the 
dictates of global partnership commitments and the overall oscillating domestic 
dynamics associated with transitioning to democracy while also attempting to attain 
economic independence. 
The issues raised above may not be completely insurmountable, instead they 
present several opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development 
cooperation. The definition of cooperation highlighted in the above sections 
highlights that cooperation is based on a mutual understanding of contributions and 
payoffs. The study also highlights that domestic, international and transnational 
factors are all contributing to meagre partnerships outcomes; however they are not 
contributing to the enduring development policy payoffs. The following measures can 
be taken to improve the prospects for enduring solutions to enduring development 
problems, through development policy.  
Domestically it has been established that the current hybrid democracy model is not 
delivering opportunities for civic engagement which is sensitive to a plurality of 
interests. This suggests that some sections of the Malawian populace may be 
underrepresented in the development policy process or indeed the resultant policy. It 
has also been established that theoretically a more purist model of democracy 
increases the probability of civic engagement (Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). 
There are broadly two models of democracy on a spectrum; these have been 
established as the representative and deliberative models of democracy (Isakhan& 
Gagnon, 2010; Stadelmann-Steffen, & Freitag, 2011). It has also established that 
deliberative democracy is viewed as an extension of representative democracy 
(Chambers, 2003; Nabatchi, 2010).  
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In seeking the most appropriate democratic track to take in a context with a range of 
complexities and indications of underrepresentation, it is recommended that Malawi 
consider adopting a more deliberative model of democracy, to create an environment 
conducive to increased civic engagement and narrow the current democratic deficit. 
This is supported further by the argument that comparatively“…the institutional 
designs of deliberative democracy are inclusive and sensitive to the value plurality 
inherent in complex policy issues, they can help rediscover the public’s preferences 
and ameliorate the democratic deficit.” (Nabatchi, 2010, p. 387). This solution is 
within the manageable control of domestic development actors. 
Internationally, it has been established that locally based donor agencies need to 
improve the effectiveness of the local technical cooperation that they provide in 
Malawi. It has been established that the person level institutional capacity of these 
agencies is a challenge to the development policy process. The most prominent 
factor contributing to this person level institutional memory is the organisational 
human resourcing strategy adopted by these agencies, which revolves the term of 
office of technical personnel within a short horizon. Consequently, turnover 
timeframe for revolving foreign aid personnel does not correspond with the long-view 
horizon of the enduring development problems identified above. A change in 
resourcing strategy may not be the most achievable recommendation, and would 
require further study to establish the feasibility of this kind of a recommendation. 
However, there is a case for donor agencies working in Malawi, to improve their local 
capacities for engaging on the long term and enduring development problems that 
exceed the short-term horizon of their term of office.  
Bertin Martens (2005) provides two nuanced primary reasons why aid agencies 
exist. They exist to “provide economies of scale and institutional arrangements that 
reduce [foreign aid transaction] costs, and mediate between donors and recipients to 
reduce uncertainties due to diverging preferences” (Martens, 2005, p. 660). These 
overarching primary objectives offer insight into the tangential attention to the 
conditions for abiding local level engagement, with the ability to track and respond to 
fluctuations in the complex local context. Foreign aid agencies in Malawi need to 
ensure that they build the necessary person level and organisation level skills and 
capacities to anticipate, as well as manage the intricate processes associated with 
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development cooperation (Gulati, et. al., 2012). This recommendation is potentially 
within the manageable control of donor agencies. 
Possibly the most problematic sphere, to address the obstacles to effective 
partnerships in, is the transnational sphere. Faust (2010) proposes that development 
cooperation needs to “…promote a mutual learning process that is flexible enough to 
adapt constantly to experimental and open-ended political processes” (Faust, 2010, 
p. 531). There are two recommendations for the implementation of this overarching 
recommendation. The first applies to the global partnership commitments, upon 
which transnational partnership commitments that govern this obscure sphere, rely. 
Shortcomings have been identified in the design of the most prominent global 
commitment on partnerships, the Paris Declaration. The 2013 World Bank 
assessment categorised Malawi as a fragile state. It was established that the term 
fragile state has negative connotations for affected countries, as such is heavily 
contested, and that this is undermining the utility of the term (Bertoli & Ticci, 
2012).However, it was also established that there are exceptional principles for 
engaging in fragile states within the PD, and that these principles require 
improvements to make the conditions and guidelines for their use clearer to all users.  
The first recommendation relates to recasting and de-stigmatising the term fragile 
state on one hand and enhancing the guidelines for engagement in fragile states and 
situations. This recommendation is in the manageable control of both the individual 
donor agencies and a range of international platforms for development cooperation, 
specifically the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. It has 
been established that locally based donor agency personnel, at both the individual 
and organisational levels, have disproportionate influence in the development policy 
process. It has also been established that this is complicated by the tangential 
organisational emphasis on developing favourable conditions for local level 
engagement. However, although skills and capacities in donor agencies for engaging 
with the notion of fragility and its practical implications are low, there are still very 
good reasons to enhance their skills and capacities, because “donors' definitions can 
induce development actors to miss the signs of fragility and vulnerability to crisis or 
even to promote reforms and policies that exacerbate fragility” (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012, 
p. 221).This is significant in Malawi given its current position as fragile, overly donor 
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compliant and aid dependent, as such Malawi cannot afford the risk of reforms and 
policies that could exacerbate its fragility. 
Internationally it is recommended that donor agencies also develop their local level 
skills and capacities for recasting fragility in cooperation on development policy. In 
practical terms, the donor agencies operating in Malawi should invest in senior level 
personnel, with both the diplomatic and technical skills to engage on development 
policy in a fragile situation, without eliciting the total rejection of otherwise valuable 
categorisations that have the potential to improve cooperation on development 
policy. A specific strategy that these senior level personnel can employ is to support 
a modified and better articulated relationship between the state and non-state 
service providers (NSP). It is important to declare that this study did not conduct a 
robust examination of the role of NSP; however the study did uncover two relevant 
findings. Firstly, it has been established that consultations on development policy 
tends to exclude civil society organisations (CSO), and secondly it has also been 
established that service sector issues are prioritised at the expense of governance 
and democracy issues. 
The exclusion of CSOs which also includes NSPs, in development policy process, 
suggests that their role in development policy may not be adequately addressed. 
While the bias towards service sector issues implies that there may be more 
willingness to reform service delivery, than the more enduring concerns with reforms 
to the democratic governance practices and approach. As such a pragmatic 
recommendation, within the manageable control of local level donor agencies, is to 
provide technical support to the state, to assist them in making the “strategic choices 
about how to deploy their limited capacity for engagement with NSPs most 
effectively, and without risk to pro-poor or pro-service outcomes” (Batley & 
Mcloughlin, 2010, p. 149). This statement presupposes a lack of capacity in the 
Malawian government to make strategic choices on the use of NSPs. Malawi’s 2013 
CPIA on quality of public administration, which includes a measurement of service 
delivery and operational efficiency, received a score of 3.0 out of 6 were 6 is high. 
This measurement can be used as a proxy for capacity to engage with NSPs, further 
supporting the recommendation. 
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The second recommendation to improve partnerships in the transnational sphere is 
to address the more pervasive challenges with the definition of fragility. It has been 
established that definitions of fragility range from those associated with national 
security to those associated with performance based allocation concerns, illustrating 
the definitional ambiguities associated with a definition (Bertoli & Ticci, 2012). It has 
also been established that this means that divergent countries showing divergent 
symptoms of fragility can in practice, be clustered in the same group requiring the 
same cooperation strategies, which it has also been established can inadvertently 
exacerbate the state of fragility. This suggests that the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation also needs to invest in further research to 
sharpen the definition of fragility, possibly along a gradient demonstrating the 
different conflict and non-conflict related contexts of state fragility. To accompany 
this transnational recommendation, international donor agencies will need to ensure 
that their locally based agencies have the skills and capacity to track and implement 
these refinements to the definition of fragility. To complete the cycle domestically by 
institutionalise the practice of strategically utilising global partnership commitments 
locally, both the government and local civil society organisations will need to work on 
building their capacities to equally engage using a refined definition of fragility. 
International donor agency technical cooperation could provide support to 
government and civil society to build this capacity for effective engagement on 
issues related to fragility. 
While an array of undesirable effects on development policy in local level 
engagement on development policy in Malawi have been identified, some desirable 
effects of engagement on development policy have also been identified, with regards 
to the more ephemeral development problems, and it would be desirable to replicate 
these outcomes more sustainably with the more enduring development problems.  
The conclusions and recommendations detailed above demonstrate an overarching 
disconnect between the partnership principles, that are espoused in global 
development commitments, and the local level development practice, that inform 
engagement on development policy domestically. The responsibility of evening out 
this asymmetric situation lies with both the sovereign state and the collective local 
level donor agency workforce. The global commitments have invested extensive 
resources into establishing the overarching global ideals for engagement on 
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development policy, however as the study demonstrates there are genuine 
challenges in cascading these commitments and principles downwards to the local 
context.  
For Malawi the specific commitments that need to be domesticated are those on 
National Ownership, which this study recommends should be through Deliberative 
Democratic Development processes; and Mutual Accountability, which will set the 
conditions for more symmetric power relationships between aid recipients and donor 
agency practitioners. Donor aid has increased for development outcomes, yet it is 
unclear whether there is a proportionate aid allocation to support the strengthening 
of development processes that underlies engagement on development policy.  
The study shows that while there are political and historical challenges to 
engagement on development policy in Malawi, there are also some clear technical 
solutions to these challenges and gaps, which can be implemented given sufficient 
financial support for implementation. While it can be argued that Malawi should self-
finance the implementation of these critical technical solutions as a display of 
National Ownership. However, the study also shows that the country may have to 
make substantial financial tradeoffs that it cannot necessarily afford at present. In 
which case, in the short to medium term, both the sovereign state and donor 
agencies working in Malawi should mutually leverage global commitments, 
domestically, and use them to negotiate for an increase in development aid 
committed to improve the country’s development processes.      
A number of recommendations have been proposed to improve the conditions for 
solving development challenges recognising that they range from short to long term, 
in a way that is more sustainable. In conclusion it is important to note that, the 
interconnected nature of the development problems which partnerships seek to 
solve, require equally interconnected and complex solutions to contribute towards 
addressing these problems. These interconnected and complex solutions are in the 
realm of influence of the domestic, international and transnational actors, and 
therefore require an interconnected effort.   
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX 1 –INTERVIEWGUIDE 
QUESTION 1: In what ways does engagement emerge between public officials 
and locally based practitioners, on political and technical issues relating to 
development policy? 
 Is there a process for incorporating diverse interests into development policy 
in Malawi  
o Is this process well-articulated and available to all the relevant actors 
 Are there mechanisms built into the process for mitigating against bias 
towards narrow special interests, both those originating from domestic and 
donor actors, and how well do they work? 
 What role do public servants play in ensuring that diverse interests are 
incorporated into the development of (development) policy in Malawi?  
o What are their limitations? 
o What needs to change to remove these limitations to facilitating the 
incorporation of diverse interests in the development of policy? 
 What role do donor agency practitioners play, in ensuring that diverse 
interests have indeed been incorporated into the development of 
(development) policy in Malawi?  
o What are their limitations? 
o What needs to change to remove these limitations to providing 
support to the incorporation of diverse interests in the development of 
policy? 
SUB-QUESTION 1: What role do the evolving global partnership 
commitments play, in the engagement between public officials and 
locally based practitioners, on development policy in Malawi? 
i.e. Accra Accord 2005, Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness 2008, Busan 2011, 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) etc. 
 Which one, do you think, is most relevant to Development Policy in Malawi 
and why?  
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SUB-QUESTION 2: With the above observations in mind, what are the 
effects (if any) on development policy in Malawi, as a result of 
engagement between public officials and locally based practitioners? 
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APPENDIX 2 – INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
Who I am 
Hello, I am Thokozile Chisala. I am a student with the University of Witwatersrand, 
in South Africa, studying for a Masters in Management in the Area of Public and 
Development Management (MM-PDM).  
What am I doing 
I am conducting a research on the Effects of engagement between Public Officials 
and locally-based donor-agency Practitioners, on Development Policy in Malawi, for 
academic purposes. In fulfilment of the research I will conduct a preliminary study 
with various experts, to find out more about practices related to the subject of study, 
as well as people’s views of these practices, and how they affect Development 
Policy in Malawi. 
Your Participation  
I am asking you whether you will allow me to conduct one interview with you about 
your knowledge and opinions on the way in which public officials and locally based 
donor agency practitioners, engage on development policy in Malawi. If you agree, I 
will ask you to participate in one interview for approximately 1 hour. I will also ask 
you to give me permission to tape record the interview. I am requesting to tape 
record the interview, so that I can accurately record what is said. 
Please understand that your participation is voluntary and you are not being 
forced to take part in this study. The choice of whether to participate or not, is yours 
alone. If you choose not to take part, you will not be affected in any way whatsoever. 
If you agree to participate, you may stop participating in the research at any time and 
tell me that you do not want to continue. If you do this there will also be no penalties 
and you will not be prejudiced in any way. 
Confidentiality  
Any records that identify you will be kept confidential to the extent possible by law. 
The records from your participation may be reviewed by people responsible for 
making sure that the research is done properly, including members in the ethics 
committee at the University of Witwatersrand. (All of these people are required to 
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keep your identity confidential). Otherwise, records that identify you will be available 
only to people working in the study, unless you give permission for other people to 
see the records. 
The information you provide will not be published unless you give your specific 
permission in writing at the end of this consent form. All identifying information will be 
kept in a locked filling cabinet and or a password protected electronic device, and will 
not be available to others. I will refer to you by a code number or pseudonym 
(another name) in any publication. 
Risk/discomforts 
At the present time, I do not see any risks in your participation. The risks associated 
with participation in this study are no greater than those encountered in daily work 
and life. 
Benefits 
There are no immediate benefits to you from participating in this study. However, this 
study will be helpful contributing to the body of knowledge available on the effects of 
engagement on development policy in Malawi. 
If you would like to receive feedback on this study, I will keep a record of your 
contact details, and send you the results of the study when it has been completed 
sometime in March 2014. 
CONSENT 
I hereby agree to participate in research on the Effects of engagement between 
Public Officials and locally-based donor-agency Practitioners, on Development 
Policy in Malawi. I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced 
in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop participating at any point 
should I not want to continue, and that this decision will not in any way affect me 
negatively. 
I understand that this is a research project, whose purpose is not necessarily to 
benefit me personally in the immediate term. 
I understand that my participation will remain confidential. 
…………………………     ………………………… 
Signature of Participant     Date 
I hereby agree to the tape-recording of my participation in the study 
 
…………………………     ………………………… 
Signature of Participant     Date 
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APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Public Official Interviewees 
1. Chauncy Simwaka – Budget Director, Ministry of Finance (Former Director in the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development) 
2. Cliff Kenneth Chiunda – Principal Secretary, Office of the President and Cabinet 
(Former Director for Programs and Projects Implementation in the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development) 
3. Nations Msowoya – Government Spokesperson, Malawi Ministry of Finance 
4. Ted Stimawina – Principal Secretary, Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development 
Donor Interviewees 
5. Ashish Shah – Evaluation and Results Team Leader, Department for 
International Development (DFID) Malawi 
6. Julius Munthali – Governance Adviser, European Union (EU) Malawi 
7. Kristine Herrmann – Democracy and Governance Office Director, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) Malawi 
8. Lamulo Nsanja – Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) Coordinator, 
Deutsche Gesellschaftfür Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Malawi  
9. Michael Nyirenda – Governance Adviser, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Malawi 
Civil Society Organisations Interviewees 
10. Chris Chisoni – Executive Director, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
(CCJP) 
11. Robert Phiri – Executive Director, Public Affairs Committee 
 
